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 2 
Introduction 
 
On May 14, 1948 David Ben Gurrion declared the independence of the state of 
Israel.  This event forever changed the climate of the Middle East.  Today, the conflict 
born 64 years ago between Israel and Palestine continues on.  Since 1948, the conflict has 
evolved to become extremely complex, encompassing all aspects of Israeli and 
Palestinian life.  Throughout the years the conflict between the two groups has taken on 
many shapes.  From terrorist attacks to failed peace negotiations the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has been the setting for one of the most well-known and controversial battles of 
the modern world.   
In the last decade, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seen a new obstacle arise in 
the form of the Israeli Security Barrier, which is being constructed between the state of 
Israel and the West Bank. The Israeli security barrier was created in 2002 as a response to 
security threats from the Palestinian entity.  Since creation, the barrier has played an 
incredibly important role in the conflict.  It has become a major focus of the Israeli 
government, the Palestinian population and the international community at large. This 
paper will investigate the specifics of the Israeli Security Barrier and provide a more 
profound understanding of this simplistic concrete structure.   
The first chapter of this paper will provide information about the security barrier 
as well as present the major debates that already surround this topic.  Furthermore, the 
first chapter will look at other defense systems that have existed throughout history.  This 
will allow for the establishment of historical relevance as well as comparison throughout 
the paper.  The second chapter of this paper will examine the offensive and defensive 
nature of the barrier by investigating the debates surrounding the offense-defense theory. 
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After presenting a concise overview of the current debates of scholars like George 
Quester and Stephen Biddle, this chapter will attempt to determine whether the barrier is 
more of an offensive or defensive entity.  This chapter will also discuss deterrence and 
provide a formulated argument against the idea of the wall as a deterrent.  The third 
chapter of this paper will question whether or not the Israeli Security Barrier is actually 
about security.  Using arguments from strategic barrier experts like Brent L. Sterling, this 
chapter will look at evidence to support the claim that the barrier is more about borders 
than it is actually about security.  Finally, the conclusion chapter will discuss the future 
implications of the wall on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as well as the entire 
conflict.   
Developing out of an actual visit to the Israeli security barrier, the topic for this 
paper will provide insight into one of the most controversial pieces of the conflict to date. 
The chapters will establish and develop arguments that have not been heavily researched 
by scholars in the international community.  Furthermore, the investigation of the Israeli 
security barrier presented in this paper will allow for a deeper understanding of the 
complexity of the current atmosphere surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to dissect one of the major issues facing the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict today while providing insight about the reality in the Middle East.    
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Chapter I: Literature Review 
Israel currently has two security barriers.  The first barrier was erected along the 
border separating Israel from the Gaza strip.  It was completed in 1995 and since that 
time has been nearly 100 percent effective in preventing terrorists from entering Israel 
from the Gaza Strip (Lochery 24).  This fence has not been particularly controversial 
because it is located on the border and does not involve the “taking” of Palestinian land.  
Furthermore, the border between Israel and Gaza is settled, since Israel has renounced all 
claims to the land in Gaza and there is no disputed territory nor do any Israeli settlements 
exist in the Gaza strip.  
The second wall, which will eventually divide Israel from the entire West Bank, 
has become much more disputed and contested.  In June 2002, the Israeli’s Defense 
Minister at the time, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, cut the ribbon on the first phase of the West 
Bank Wall near the Israeli village of Salem (Dolphin 6).  Over the next three years, the 
wall headed south through the West Bank, surrounding Jewish settlements on or near the 
Green Line.
1
 The wall then cut an arc around the north, east, and south of Palestinian East 
Jerusalem and eventually rejoined the Green Line west of Bethlehem.    
Once completed, the length of the route will be approximately 500 miles in total.  
As of late 2010, fifty-seven per cent of the construction had already been completed 
while nine per cent was under construction and thirty-four per cent had been carefully 
planned.  According to numerous maps and sources, fourteen per cent of the total planned 
route of the barrier runs along the green line and eighty-six per cent is located beyond the 
green line (Makovsky 1).  The barrier creates a situation in which all inhabitants of the 
West Bank will be cut off from East Jerusalem.  
                                                        
1
 Green Line: The armistice border established in 1949 at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war.  
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Israeli citizens face a severe security threat.  Many argue that the wall was built as 
a response to the major security threat of the second, or al Aqsa, intifada, which was the 
Palestinian’s second national revolt in less than a decade. Unlike the first intifada (1987-
1993), the second wave of violence that erupted in September 2000 was not a popular 
uprising; instead it was a coordinated campaign by members of Hamas, the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigade aimed at bringing down the Israeli government (Palti 1).  Suicide 
attacks took place on buses or in shopping malls, restaurants, and hotels.  The majority 
killed by these attacks were civilians, including women and children.  According to the 
Israel Defense Force (IDF), during the three-year period of the most recent or second 
Intifada, there were 53 “successful” suicide infiltrations, which killed 472 Israeli citizens; 
another 70 suicide terrorists infiltrated Israel but were stopped before reaching their 
targets (Palti 2). The vast majority of these attacks were staged, planned and executed 
from the West Bank.   
Due to the increase in suicide attacks coupled with the loss of innocent lives, the 
Israeli government was under considerable public pressure to present a workable solution 
to the security issue.  While many of the Israeli Defense Force and Israeli government 
operations against West Bank terrorist cells are often interpreted to be collective 
punishment of Palestinians, Israel has a duty to protect its population and ensure its 
territorial integrity.  Thus, basic steps such as checkpoints and roadblocks, in addition to 
more involved actions such as “Operation Defensive Shield”, are necessary.  These 
responses to terrorism were not intended to express Israeli sentiment against the 
Palestinian people, only against the Palestinian terrorists (Cypel 152).  Although these 
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strategies proved to be somewhat effective, infiltration by suicide bombers were still 
occurring.   
The solution became the Israeli Security Barrier. This plan has proven effective 
before in Israel’s other border areas.  Other fences follow the Israeli-Lebanese border, the 
Golan Heights area and circle the Gaza Strip.  The Gaza fence is particularly effective; it 
is actually a security “system,” consisting of a dirt road, followed by a portion of fence, 
then another road for patrols.  It has not allowed a single successful suicide bomber to 
infiltrate Israel (Elizur 108).  This phenomenon provided the Israeli Government with 
concrete evidence and confidence regarding the potential effectiveness of constructing 
another security wall with the goal of combating terrorism.  The evidence and statistics 
that have been produced since the establishment of many sections of the wall are 
impressive.   
While the first stage of the wall was under construction between October 2000 
and July 2003, 35 “successful” suicide attacks originated from the northern West Bank 
alone.  However, in the first year after the completion of the first stage, only 3 successful 
suicide attacks have originated from the northern West Bank (Palti 2).  In 2004, the Israel 
Defense Force successfully foiled every suicide bomb attack attempt from the northern 
West Bank.  It is believed that the new barrier has forced terrorists to travel many 
kilometers to circumvent the fence.  This lengthy trip has given the Israel Defense Forces 
as well as Israeli intelligence more time to locate infiltrators and foil their plans.   
 An example of the success of the security barrier came in June of 2004, when a 
terrorist group was exposed by the IDF.  The IDF, in conjunction with Israeli 
intelligence, discovered that Hezbollah was sponsoring and guiding a terrorist group, 
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headed by a man named Halil Araisha.  Araisha had a long history of involvement with 
terrorist organizations and was recruiting young men to participate in suicide bombings.  
One such person was Mahand Karini from a refugee camp in Nablus, a city in the West 
Bank.  The security fence posed a new problem for the exportation of suicide bombers 
from Nablus to Israel and thus forced the terrorist group to move.  Karini was instructed 
to move a twenty-five kilogram bomb to another village.  The IDF became suspicious of 
this movement and was able to discover the terrorist organization and defuse the bomb.  
The mobilization of terrorists with bombs over long routes has given the IDF more time 
to discover attacks and foil them before it is too late (Palti 3-4).   
The security zone serves as an obstacle to both vehicles and people. Although the 
Palestinians may not wish to admit it, one of the effects of the fence is to limit Israel’s 
vulnerability to suicide attacks.  The fence is only one part of a broader strategy that has 
succeeded in lowering the threshold of violence. Interestingly enough, a poll of 
Palestinian attitudes taken by the Jerusalem Media and Communications center suggests 
that 36.4 per cent of Palestinians believe that the fence is effective in diminishing attacks 
(Fernon 6).   
Although the territory of the West Bank is very complicated, not only because of 
the large distance covered but also because of the separated Palestinian populations, the 
building of a security fence will essentially accomplish the same goal that the other 
fences have: providing more security and diminishing the success of suicide bombers.  
The following is an analysis of the current debates and issues surrounding the Israeli 
Security Barrier. The complexity of the situation has created a worldwide conflict with 
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many different influences.  The goal of the information below is to provide context to the 
conflict that is currently taking place between Israel and the West Bank.   
 
Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html 
I. The Route  
The route of the wall has become the center of much debate and discussion for 
Israelis, Palestinians and the international community at large.  When planning the route, 
the Israeli government had to evaluate numerous variables, such as topography, 
population density, and a threat assessment for each area. The end product created a path, 
that weaved in and out of the West Bank, attempting to follow the Green Line, but 
inevitably making abrupt turns to encompass Israeli interests and settlements.   
The fence was built in stages. Phase A of construction, approximately 85 miles 
from Salem to Elkana, was completed at the end of July 2003. Phase B, which is about 50 
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miles, runs from Salem toward Bet-Shean, through the Jezreel Valley and the Gilboa 
mountains. It was completed in 2004 (Kershner 18).   
Phase C of construction incorporates Jerusalem, one of the most highly contested 
territories in the world.  During the al-Aqsa intifada, more than 30 suicide bombings 
targeted Jerusalem. Between 2000 and 2008, a total of 90 terrorist attacks have killed 170 
people and injured 1,500 in the capital (Kershner 19). The original “Jerusalem Defense 
Plan” approved in March 2003 called for the fence to be constructed around three parts of 
the capital, which has been the most frequent target of suicide bombers (Elizur 107). This 
section of the fence was expected to run about 40 miles around the municipal boundaries 
of the city. However, both Israeli and Palestinian residents in areas along the fence route 
filed legal challenges that required changes in the construction plan (Cypel 391).    
Phase D will span approximately 93 miles from Elkana to Ofer. In addition, 
several special sections of the fence will protect specific areas and populations. An inside 
fence of 15 miles will protect the road from the airport to Jerusalem. A fence around the 
town of Ariel will stretch about 35 miles and a 31-mile section will traverse the road 
between Ariel and Kedumim. A 32-mile span will go from Jerusalem to Gush Etzion, and 
another 19 miles will surround Gush Etzion with the purpose of incorporating 10 
settlements and approximately 50,000 Israelis.  Finally, the fence will continue an 
additional 58 miles to Carmel (Kershner 20).   
There are 630 closures in the West Bank.  Closures take the form of checkpoints, 
partial checkpoints, road gates, roadblocks, earth mounds, trenches, road barriers, and 
earth walls (Fernon 2).  This number does not include a weekly reported average of 60-80 
flying checkpoints over the West Bank. The government has also created 70 agricultural 
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“gates” in the wall. These gates are situated in strategic locations of high agricultural 
productivity.  Essentially, Palestinians must cross through these gates in order to reach 
their farms.   In practice, these do not guarantee access of Palestinian farmers to their 
lands but instead strengthen Israel’s system of permits and checkpoints imposed on 
Palestinians in the West Bank (Fernon 3).   The harm to the farming sector prevents 
Palestinian farmers from gaining additional income and prevents an increase in the 
number of Palestinians working in agriculture, which is a major sector of the Palestinian 
economy. The wall will also create a situation in which 125,000 Palestinians will be 
surrounded on three sides while 35,000 Palestinians will live in closed enclaves 
(Makovsky 1). 
 
Source:http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html 
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II. Wall or Fence 
There is a small debate surrounding the terminology for the new security 
measures being put in place in Israel.  Although the argument does not play an important 
role in political debate, scholars have argued that it does play a significant role in the 
psychological effect on the people encountering the barrier’s presence.  In order to 
examine this phenomenon, it is first necessary to investigate the construction of the 
barrier.   
It should be stressed that “barrier” will be used as a generic term for a physical 
separation that will assume different forms in different locations.  In places where Jewish 
and Palestinian population centers are close to each other, it might take the form of a high 
concrete wall that not only prevents infiltration by terrorists but also gives protection 
against light arms fire.  In other places, the barrier could be an electronic fence.   
The fence construction is the more frequently used design and is augmented by a 
number of static security features.  On at least one or both sides are paved roads for patrol 
vehicles that are surrounded by smooth strips of sand to track footprints of intruders.  On 
the Palestinian side there is a ditch or trench to stop vehicles from attempting to drive 
through the fence. There are also pyramid stacks of sharp razor wire, some two meters 
tall.  With all of these features, the fence construction consumes about 30-70 meters of 
space.  Warning signs are placed on the fences with Arabic, Hebrew and English 
warnings reading “Mortal Danger, Military Zone.  Any person who passes or damages 
the fence endangers his life” (Dolphin 22). 
The wall construction is made of precast concrete sections that are generally 8 
feet high.  They are used in areas where the threat of sniper fire or gunfire is highly 
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probable.  These concrete walls are also put in places where it is difficult to build a fence 
for geographical reasons.  The concrete walls also include surveillance towers and 
cameras.  Relative to the fence construction system, these walls appear as formidable and 
oppressive structures (Dolphin 24).   
The debate surrounding the fence versus wall discussion does not question either 
method’s effectiveness.  In fact, both structures are equally effective and destructive in 
terms of the security.  However, on a psychological level the wall construction is much 
more devastating.  In a study done by the People’s Health Movement titled The Impact of 
Israel’s Separation Wall on Palestinian Mental Health, 945 citizens of the West Bank 
were sampled for a psychological study.  Those citizens sampled who lived in areas 
where a concrete wall surrounded them showed much more physical and emotional 
symptoms than those who lived in villages with fences.   The study showed that those 
who were surrounded by physical walls demonstrated a lack of motivation to perform 
daily actives, an appearance of paranoia, fear and sadness (PHM 2005).  Furthermore, the 
study explained that the negative impact of the wall on the Palestinian citizen increases 
everyday because the wall negatively affects the basic physiological needs of the human 
being, such as the need for security, love, a sense of belonging and the need to feel 
appreciated which is the main factor for self esteem.  Upon a physical look at the Wall, 
according to the study, Palestinians can see that they are faced a set of blocks of steel and 
cement surrounded by residential concentrations and closed within iron gates (PHM 
2005). These blocks are difficult to break through and in practical terms, people living 
inside them are isolated from their sources of income (economic isolation), threatening 
the basic needs in terms of food, drink and medicine. Where as the fence provides some 
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opportunity to see the other side, and thus possibly feel hope, the wall structure does not 
provide any such hope for the future (PHM 2005).   
 
Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html 
III. Legal v. Illegal 
The question of the legality of the Security Barrier is one of the most prominent 
conversations surrounding its construction.  Two courts have addressed the legal issues 
regarding the placement of the security barrier as well as humanitarian impact that the 
barrier has had.   
The first court to adjudicate this matter was the Supreme Court of Israel.  The 
court ruled that when establishing the Security Barrier, the Israeli government has both a 
legal and moral obligation to all its citizens.  By law, the Israeli Supreme Court is a 
creation of the Israeli legislature and is therefore representative of all people, regardless 
of religion.  Furthermore, the Israeli Supreme Court has a mandate to consider  both sides 
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of the fence dispute. Its job is to balance the security needs of its citizens against the 
humanitarian needs of the West Bank Palestinians (Dershowitz 101).  The Israeli 
Supreme Court has tried to strike that balance by upholding the creation of a security 
fence while insisting that the Israeli military authorities give due weight to the needs of 
the Palestinians, even if that requires some compromise with the security of Israelis.  It is 
important to note that under Israeli law the Israeli Supreme Court is open to all Israelis 
including Arabs from Israel, Gaza and the West Bank.  In fact, the Israeli Supreme Court 
was, until recently, one of the only courts in the Middle East where an Arab could win a 
case against his government (Dershowitz 102).   
The second court to consider Israel’s security barrier was the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague.  No Israeli judge is allowed to serve on that court as a 
permanent member, while several of the judges, like Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf of 
Somalia, represent countries that do not themselves abide by the rule of law (Dershowitz 
103). On July 9, 2004 the ICJ rendered an advisory opinion in the case of the legality of 
the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory that was brought before the 
court by a emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly.  Virtually 
every democracy in our current world voted against the court’s decision to take 
jurisdiction of the fence case, while nearly every country that voted to take jurisdiction 
was a tyranny.  The court found that “the construction of the wall being built by Israel, 
the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East 
Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law” (ICJ Press Release 
2004).  This legal decision was made by the ICJ through a series of steps that included:  
the court establishing its jurisdiction, the court debating the legality of the construction of 
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the wall and finally, the court providing legal consequences of the violations found (ICJ 
Press Release 2004). Although an advisory opinion is not binding on the parties to a 
conflict, such an opinion is highly regarded as it comes from the most distinguished 
international legal body (Fernon 3). From Israel’s standpoint, the country owes the ICJ 
absolutely nothing.  It is under neither a moral nor a legal obligation to give any weight to 
its predetermined decision.   
The Supreme Court of Israel and the International Court of Justice have varying 
opinions on the legality of the wall.  The Supreme Court of Israel recognized the 
unquestionable reality that the security fence has saved numerous lives and promises to 
save more, but it also recognized that this benefit must not out weigh the material 
disadvantages to West Bank Palestinians (Dershowitz 104).  On the other hand, the 
International Court of Justice dismissed the idea of saving lives and only focused on 
Palestinian interests.  The advisory opinion coupled with the preference of the ICJ for 
Palestinian property rights over the lives of Jews demonstrates the one sided-ness of the 
court (Fernon 4).   
IV. Economics 
There are two parts to the economic debate over the Security Barrier.  The first 
part deals with economic impacts of the wall within each territory, focusing on how the 
wall will affect the Israeli and Palestinian economies respectively.  The second part of the 
debate questions the cost of the wall. This question includes a cost-benefit analysis 
examining the billions of dollars that will be spent on the construction and maintenance 
of the barrier in relation to its effectiveness.   
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With regard to the economic impact, on the Israeli side, the terrorist attacks in the 
more densely populated areas of the country have greatly damaged the Israeli economy 
by causing a severe downturn in the tourism industry and forcing the government to bar 
Palestinians from working in Israel. Israeli economic losses have ranged from 10 to 14 
billion in shekels, which is a startling sum considering that Israel’s annual security budget 
is 30 to 35 billion shekels
2
 (Ross 62).  Building the barrier and thereby preventing 
terrorists from reaching the densely populated areas of Israel would help to revitalize the 
economy.   
For the Palestinians, there is no doubt the completed fence will further impose 
genuine economic hardships.  Palestinian jobs in Israel will be jeopardized by the 
closures of crossings through the wall.  Limited access to Palestinian farms will also have 
a substantial effect on the Palestinian economy.  In many areas, the security barrier has 
divided farmers from their land.  The Israeli Government has granted Palestinians only 
limited access to these farms and sometimes does not allow the farmers to get to their 
farms at all.  The lack of opportunity outside of the West Bank will cause the needs for 
jobs to be created inside of the West Bank, which, due to limited resources, will be 
extremely hard to achieve (Ross 64).   
The second economic debate surrounds the cost of the wall.  Built at a cost of $1.6 
million to $2.5 million per mile, the separation barrier is the largest public construction 
project in either Israel or the Palestinian Territories. It is almost two-thirds complete and 
the cost of the project has already ballooned from a projected $1 billion to more than $2.1 
billion (Ross 65). Many have questioned whether the price is actually worth the pay-off 
                                                        
2
 1 USD=3.80 Israeli Shekels  
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and wonder if the upkeep of the wall in the future will hurt the Israeli economy even 
more.   
V. Settlements 
The settlement debate is both highly controversial and extremely complex.  Since 
the creation of the first section of the wall, Palestinians, Israelis and the international 
community have criticized Israel for the way in which it has dealt with Israeli settlements 
inside the West Bank.  A map of the security barrier shows that, for the most part the 
route follows the Green Line of 1949.  However, when the barrier makes a turn into the 
West Bank, it usually does so in order to keep an Israeli settlement within Israel’s de 
facto borders, often with the consequence of cutting Palestinian villages in half and 
separating Palestinians from their neighbors as well as their farms.   
There are currently 121 Israeli settlements built on Palestinian land in the West 
Bank.  According to international law, all of these settlements are illegal and have been 
condemned by both the United Nations Security Council as well as the international 
community at large. A population of some 462,000 Israeli settlers inhabits these 
settlements. Furthermore, approximately 385,000 settlers in 80 settlements will be 
located between the Separation Wall and the Green Line if Israel holds to current plans 
(Palestinian 3).  Settlements are built on less than 3 percent of the area of the West Bank. 
However, due to the extensive network of settler roads and restrictions on Palestinians 
accessing their own land, Israeli settlements dominate more than 40 percent of the West 
Bank.  The largest settlement Ariel, which has a population of 40,000 and encompasses 
1-2 per cent of the West Bank, has been targeted as the most controversial area in the 
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West Bank because of Israel’s commitment to developing the settlement area (Palestinian 
3-4).   
Over the years there have been numerous settlement freezes as the world 
continues to put pressure on the Israeli government. In an explanation by the Israeli 
government, a statement was released stating: “ The fear is that erection of the barrier 
will channel the attacks to these communities, so it was decided to have the fence pass 
east of these settlements in order to provide protection for them and for the access roads 
that reach them” (Lochery 86). Israel feels that these citizens need security and that 
building the wall to surround these areas is the only way the government can succeed in 
satisfying this need.   
Many people in the International community believe that solution to this issue is 
obvious.  Opponents of the settlements argue that Israel needs to disband the settlements 
entirely and move the settlers into Israel proper. However, this has become a difficult task 
as the settlers have ideologically committed to staying on their land regardless of what 
their government or military thinks. Many of these settlers have built their communities 
in areas east of Israel proper and often east of the wall that encloses the majority of illegal 
settlements. These settlers are often willing to use violence against both Israelis and 
Palestinians to have their way, and have stepped up their acts of terror and intimidation 
throughout the peace process.  The settlement debate continues to be a major obstacle 
surrounding the security barrier and will remain a contested topic until something 
permanent is done. 
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VI. Demography  
Demography is defined as the statistical study of human population.  It is no 
secret that the world’s population of Jewish people is not that large.  Even further, the 
percentage of Jewish people within the borders of Israel, despite the increase in 
population growth rate and the thousands of immigrants who come to Israel from other 
areas of the world, is dropping while the number of Palestinians is rising.  More and more 
Israelis have started to realize that if partition does not happen soon, within a decade Jews 
will be a minority in a “de facto bi-national state stretching from the Mediterranean to the 
Jordan” (Makovsky 2).  Minority status, moreover, would erode the legitimacy of Israel’s 
Jewish government both at home and abroad.  Therefore, to remain Jewish and 
democratic, Israel needs to avoid absorbing areas or population groups that will 
undermine its Jewish majority. Many have argued that the security barrier is a solution to 
this issue. Israeli Jews, by constructing the barrier, are putting a physical obstacle in the 
way of becoming a minority in their own country. This debate has caused a discussion 
about the future of Israel’s borders.  This barrier, after achieving its initial goal of 
security, may act as a new legal border between the state of Israel and the Palestinian 
entity.  Creating such a border will allow the Jewish population of Israel to remain the 
majority and thus remain in control of the state (Makovsky 2-4).  
A World of Walls 
Since the beginning of modern civilization, people have always looked for a way 
to minimize their vulnerabilities.  Whether this is a fence around their home, a moat 
around their castle or a fortification around their country, people’s need for tangible 
security has caused the construction of many different barriers.  The Israeli Security 
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Barrier is not the first of its kind, nor will it be the last.  Below is a comprehensive 
examination of a few other important “walls” that have either succeeded or failed in 
providing security to other states throughout history.   
I. Athens’ Long Walls  
During the fifth century BCE, the miles of open, low-lying land between the 
upper city of Athens and its key ports on the Saronic Gulf represented the city-states’ 
primary vulnerability (Sterling 13).  Desiring to emphasize naval power despite this 
intervening gap, the Athenians created a set of walls down to the coastline.  Athens’ main 
adversaries quickly learned about the unwelcome Long Walls. The decisions to build 
fortified walls developed out of an assessment of Athens’ other options.  
One basic option was based around the notion of expanding or improving the 
army.  Athens already possessed an effective and experienced land force that had 
operated primarily in naval-infantry operations against Persia and other rebellious allies. 
Although this option was feasible, as Athens had the money and men to increase its 
forces, it had very little appeal.  The Athenians did not regard their own force as deficient 
and therefore felt no need to improve it.  Also, increasing the manpower of the army 
would ultimately mean a decrease in power of the navy, something most Athenians were 
not inclined to support (Sterling 15).  Another option discussed was the relocation of the 
city center from Athens to Piraeus.  This move would have fit perfectly with the naval-
centered strategic outlook favored by most of the city-state.  However, no such move 
occurred, or even was attempted during any time period in Athenian history. After 
centuries atop the Acropolis, relocating the city was too radical an idea (Sterling 16).   
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Ultimately, the Long Walls offered the best response from a political 
psychological and security perspective.  Athens could build fortified walls to connect the 
city of Piraeus with its ports, eliminating the imminent vulnerability posed by an invading 
army. First, the wall would enable Athens to remain safe miles from the sea while still 
maintaining the dominance of the navy. Second, adding to the political appeal of the 
walls was the psychological comfort they would provide Athenians. Moreover, with the 
Long Walls in place, Athens’ could pursue expansion and exploration without the worry 
that the city would be captured (Sterling 22).   
On a security level, and for its time, the Athens Long Walls had everything that a 
security obstacle should.  First, any attempt to scale the walls would prove extremely 
difficult and result in large numbers of fatalities.  Second, Athens’ major enemies did not 
yet employ tunneling to go under walls.  Third, strong walls, if constructed properly, 
could withstand direct assaults, as technologies such as battering rams were not used yet.  
Finally, bypassing the Long Walls would require a run-in with Athenian navy, which was 
not a wish of any city-state or enemy of the time (Sterling 44-49).   
 Unfortunately, not much physical evidence of the Athens Long Walls exists 
today.  However, examining the information about these walls provides us with an idea of 
why Athens chose to build such a fortification.  The construction of the walls removed 
the final vulnerability of the city-state’s most prominent area and allowed Athenians to 
pursue other endeavors while continuing to strengthen the navy. The Long Walls enabled 
Athens to survive any siege. No enemy could capture the city as long as it was connected 
to its ports and controlled the sea.    
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Source: http://www.utexas.edu/courses/introtogreece/lect11/img32athpiraeslngwlls.html 
II. Hadrian’s Wall 
Whereas fifth century BCE Athens was a rising power looking to eliminate its 
primary vulnerability, Rome in the early 120s CE presented a somewhat different context 
and challenge.  The Hadrianic government, located in Britain, was one of the strongest 
powers in history and was already extremely well established. However, it struggled to 
manage and secure new domains after expanding and acquiring new territory.  Unlike in 
Athens, the Hadrianic government’s enemy was not a trained and skilled army.  Instead, 
it was British-Scottish tribes who raided and skirmished towns and cities in Northern 
England (Sterling 68).  Essentially, Hadrian’s Wall was constructed as a means to control 
the government’s newly acquired frontiers.   
The wall, stretching from the North Sea to the Irish Sea, was 80 Roman miles 
(about 73 modern miles) long, 8-10 feet wide, and 15 feet high (Sterling 70). In addition 
to the wall, the Romans built a system of small forts called milecastles every Roman mile 
along its entire length, with towers every 1/3 mile. Sixteen larger forts holding from 500 
to 1000 troops were built into the wall, with large gates on the north face. To the south of 
the wall the Romans dug a wide ditch with six foot high earth banks (Sterling 89).  The 
wall not only reflected the power of Roman empire but it also succesfully helped control 
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immigration, smuggling and customs.  Furthermore, Hadrian’s Wall succesfully reflected 
the policy of Hadrian which was defense before expansion.  The wall enabled the Roman 
empire to defend itself from invading tribes north of Britain who found it difficult to 
cross over the blockade.  Altogether, the Romans built the most advanced and effective 
security barrier of the time period.  
 
Source: NormanEinstein, September 20, 2005. 
III. The Great Wall of China  
 The Great Wall of China is the most unique and largest physical security structure 
that the world has ever seen.  It was created and built over hundrerds of years and 
stretches thousands of miles.  Built in two stages, the early stage and the Ming Dynasty 
stage, the wall originally served as a protection barrier to ward off the invasion of 
different nomadic groups.  The wall itself stretches from Shanhaiguan District in the 
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north-east of China to Nayu Pass in the West of China.  The exact measurement of the 
wall has been debated but the wall is approximatley 5,500 miles in length (Sterling 118).  
The Early Wall stage began under the rule of Qin Shi Huang and the Qin Dynasty.  
To protect his newly acquired empire against intrusions by the nomadic tribes to the 
north, Qin ordered the construction of a wall to connect the remaining fortifications along 
his new northern frontier.  Although there are no historical records, many have concluded 
that the cost of the wall in people, materials and money was very high because 
transporting all of these goods to the north took time and resources.  However, once 
created, the wall seemed to be an effective deterrent for nomadic tribes as there was a 
decrease in both invasions and violence in the northern parts of China (Sterling 130).     
Although the Early Wall stage laid the beginning foundations, it was during the 
Ming Era that the Great Wall was truly constructed.  Early on, the Ming Dynasty battled 
to gain superiority over the Manchurian and Mongolian tribes to the north (Sterling 135).  
After numerous battles and countless resources used, the Ming developed a new strategy 
to keep the nomadic tribes from entering their empire: construct a wall.  The new wall 
would be constructed along the entirety of the northern border and would differ from the 
Qin wall in strength and complexity.  The Ming dynasty employed bricks to create the 
wall and these bricks proved to be stronger and easier to work with than the previous 
materials of clay, sand, williow branches and reeds.  The Mings also chose to place 
watchtowers and lookout points throughout the wall for the purpose of spotting enemies 
coming from further away than before (Sterling 142).   The Great Wall proved to be 
effective numerous times especially during the Manchu invasions that began around the 
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1600s.  Although the Manchu’s eventually conquered the wall and invaded China it took 
them 44 years of hard battling to do so (Sterling 148).  
 
Source: http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/tourist-maps/great-wall-china/ 
IV. The Maginot Line 
The Maginot Line, which is named after the French Minister of War Andre 
Maginot, was a wall of concrete fortifications and obstacles aimed at deterring attacks on 
the country. It was constructed by France along the borders of Germany and Italy after 
the devastations of World War I (Sterling 206).  The idea for the fortification came from 
the success of defensive warfare that was executed or practiced throughout much of 
World War I.  France realized that it had a vulnerable and unprotected area that was open 
to attack and attempted to not only fortify this location but also make it an offensive 
weapon.  Furthermore, the creation of such a fortification provided the French army, 
which took numerous days to mobilize, extra time in the event of an attack (Sterling 211).  
After the initial design, military experts concluded that the Maginot Line was a 
work of greatness, believing it would prevent any further invasions from the east of 
France, most notably from Germany.  According to the French, the Maginot Line was 
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impervious to most types of attack, and had state-of-the-art living conditions for its troops 
(Sterling 223).   Although the line was state-of-the-art, it came with a steep cost. The line 
consumed a vast amount of money and subsequently led to other parts of the French 
Armed Forces being underfunded.  
Unfortunately, the Maginot Line did not serve its purpose of providing security to 
France during World War II.  In fact, the invasion plan of the German army during WWII 
was designed specifically to deal with the line.  The Germans sent a decoy force to the 
line while simultaneously sending a second army group to cut through Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  The Germans were able to avoid direct battle with the forces placed on the 
Maginot Line and were able to gain entry into France within five days of their first 
invasion (Sterling 242).  Inevitably, the Germans chose to attack the fortifications of the 
Maginot Line and successfully gained control of the majority of the line.  When World 
War II ended, the use of the Maginot Line did too.  The fortification proved ineffective 
and fairly useless and the French decided it was no longer necessary to spend money on 
the line (Sterling 251).  
 
source: http://www.toptenz.net/top-10-greatest-military-blunders-of-world-war-ii.php 
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V. Other walls 
These are just a few of the security fortifications that have existed historically. 
Other walls such as the Berlin Wall, the Bar-Lev Line in Israel, the newly constructed 
US-Mexico border fence, and the wall between India and Pakistan were or have been 
constructed for a certain reason.  Whether for security, separation or dominance these 
barriers serve a purpose.  The Israeli Security Barrier is no different than these other 
walls, as it too has been built to accomplish a goal.  
Conclusion 
This literature review has provided insight into the current debates and issues 
surrounding the Israeli security barrier.  Examining these different issues has provided a 
powerful background to the extremely controversial security barrier.  Moreover, 
reviewing other walls that have existed throughout time has allowed for a greater 
understanding of the concept behind physical defense systems.  The following chapters 
will employ the debates and issues presented in this literature review to examine two 
major pieces of the Israeli security barrier.  The next chapter of this paper will 
incorporate the offense-defense theory by exploring the offensive and defensive nature of 
the barrier and will analyze whether the barrier is an offensive or defensive entity. The 
following chapter will examine the other political goals behind the Israeli security barrier. 
This chapter will dissect the reasons for construction of the barrier and work to clarify 
why the Israeli government decided to build this structure.   
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Chapter II: Offense-Defense Theory 
 
In the book Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Stephen Van Evera 
proposed his idea of the offense-defense theory.  This theory attempts to discern what 
factors increase the likelihood that states will go to war.  Van Evera offers three 
hypotheses: 
1. War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy, or is believed 
easy, than in other periods.  
 2.  States that have, or believe they have, large offensive opportunities or 
defensive vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states.  
 3.  Actual examples of true imbalances are rare and explain only a moderate 
amount of history.  However, false perceptions of these factors are common and 
thus explain a great deal of history (Van Evera 21).     
These hypotheses sit at the heart of the offense-defense theory.  Through his discussion, 
Van Evera provides insight into the complexity of the offense-defense relationship.  Van 
Evera is neither the first nor the last person to write about this phenomenon.  In fact, 
many scholars have tackled the issue of the offense-defense balance by examining how 
different variables affect the military scale.  The offense-defense theory is now widely 
used to explain many aspects of war and conflict.  The following is an exploration of 
some of the most prominent theories surrounding the offense-defense paradox.   
I. Offense and Defense in the International System, George Quester  
George Quester has been dubbed as one of the pioneers of the offense-defense 
argument.  His book revolutionized the way in which people viewed offense and defense 
in the international system.  His discussion begins with the claim that the offensive-
defensive argument is primarily one about military capability.  Quester attempts to solve 
the dilemma by identifying the “technical, political and social factors that make it 
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advantageous to strike out offensively at the enemy rather than sitting in a prepared 
defensive positions waiting for the enemy to strike” (Quester 2).   
According to Quester, offenses are favored, and offensive action is far more 
likely, when a situation is created in which more casualties will occur if attacking first is 
not the chosen tactic.   Therefore, war must be driven by calculations of gain and loss.  
Quester provides an example of this offense-defense paradigm.  He writes,  “If a single 
bomber airplane can use gravity for the destruction of many hostile airplanes that it 
catches on an airfield below, this is a technological development that favors the 
offensive.  If a well-planned minefield imposes heavy casualties on an army trying to 
attack a fortified machine-gun nest, this is a technology that discourages taking the 
offensive and reinforces the defense” (Quester 6). Essentially, Quester is making an 
argument that the choice to be offensive or defensive derives from predictions about the 
likely outcome of a maneuver.   
Quester becomes more specific when he discusses the use of weapons.  Some 
weapons, according to Quester, might have helped offensive as well as defensive 
operations, if only they could have been moved along with an advancing army to help it 
with the battles (Quester 7).  However, the inability of certain weapons to move classifies 
them as only helping the defense.  The minefields that Quester mentions above are an 
example of this, as are antiaircraft guns or fixed artillery positions along coasts.  Since 
there is an inability to bring these weapons to the enemy, the enemy must come to the 
weapons.  Inevitably, the immobile weapons become “supremely defensive” whenever a 
conflict is being fought abroad (Quester 8). 
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Quester argues that this phenomenon makes mobility a strictly offensive value. 
First, mobility allows a country to invade with power if it can bring all of the deadly 
vehicles of destruction with it.  Second, the ability to move may allow an attacking force 
to exploit various weak spots or blind spots of the force that is standing in place (Quester 
8).  Third, the ability to move allows an attacking force to group itself, and regroup itself, 
when it decides to battle again.  Mobility allows the offensive to make sense because of 
the opportunity to choose the time and place of the battle as well as the odds (Quester 8).   
By contrast any weapon that relates to “peculiarities of terrain” will be supportive 
of the defense. Such natural occurring obstacles like marshlands, mountains, jungles or 
even our contemporary urban sprawl will favor the defense (Quester 9).  This is because 
the army defending such a region is likely to be more at home with its “peculiarities“ than 
the alien army.  Also, these “peculiarities” provide natural defensive obstacles to 
invading forces.  Overall, Quester is making the argument that those weapons that are 
permanently fixed support the defensive position.  On the other hand, if the weapons are 
mobile, the offense is favored.  Finally, Quester argues that shifts in military technology 
affect the incentives and capabilities for the offensive (Quester 10).   
 
II. Offense and Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment, Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z 
Haftel, and Kevin McSweeney  
Building on many of the arguments put forth by Quester, these theorists suggests 
that shifts in the offense-defense balance have a considerable effect on the likelihood of 
war and crisis in the international system. Gortzak, et al. state, “Factors that increase the 
ease of offensive operations or that significantly reduce the costs of such operations, 
relative to defensive operations, are argued to increases the probability of international 
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war and crisis” (Gortzak et al. 69).  These authors explain that the development of new 
technology and weapons, which favor the offensive, trigger the incentive to enter a 
conflict with another state.  More than this, the current nature of the international system 
does not allow “states to rely solely on the perceived intentions of their potential rival to 
ensure their survival” (Gortzak et al. 72).  Instead, the authors believe that countries are 
forced to assume intentions from rivals and act accordingly. Offense dominant states 
produce behavior through “flexing” technology and weaponry that allows rivals to 
understand that there is a threat. Defense dominant states communicate a strategy of 
protection and security.  According to Gortzak et al., rivals will act accordingly to these 
actions and draw conclusions about offensive or defensive intentions (Gortzak et al. 72).    
The authors conclude that “by adding factors that affect the probability of the success or 
failure of offensive strategies to existing theories about war and peace, we can greatly 
increase our ability to explain and predict the likelihood of violent disputes and wars in 
the international system” (Gortzak et al. 78). 
 
III. Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence 
Balance, Karen Ruth Adams  
In this work, Karen Adams focuses on the changing nature of the offense-defense 
balance while simultaneously incorporating deterrence in to the equation.   She argues 
that offense and defense changes over time, meaning that states should be “more 
vulnerable to conquest and more likely to attack one another at some times than others 
(Adam 46).”  More specifically, Adams provides an explanation of two time periods in 
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which “offensive operations”3 and “defensive operations”4 are more likely to occur 
(Adams 47).   
The first time period, offense-dominant eras, is when offense is easier than 
defense.  This means that defenders’ military forces should be more likely to collapse or 
surrender in response to offensive military threats.  In offense-dominant eras, states 
should be attacked more often (Adams 48). Moreover, offense-dominant eras provide a 
heightened vulnerability, which allows states to act on the idea that the best defense is a 
good offense.  The second time period, defense-dominant eras, allows states with “state-
of the art capabilities” to declare war and then wait to counterattack without hurting their 
chances of survival (Adams 49). This means that powerful states, during defense-
dominant eras, who have superior weaponry and military capability can choose to create 
a conflict but then wait to be attacked.  This will allow the state to employ defensive 
techniques to protect its interests while simultaneously having the opportunity to destroy 
a rival.  Offense-dominant eras provide security through attacking first while defense-
dominant eras provide security through limitation of attacks.   
Adams also finds it necessary to distinguish between defense and deterrence.  
First, she explains that deterrent operations are actions in which “a state prepares to use 
force or demonstrates its ability to use force to attack another states nonmilitary assets to 
deter that state from attacking it or to deter if rom further attacks once a war has begun 
(Adams 52).”  From this statement it can be concluded that deterrent operations entail 
                                                        
3
 Offensive operations:  are actions in which a state uses force to attack another state’s military or 
nonmilitary assets to conquer its territory or compel compliance with policy directives (impose its 
will on the other state)  
4
 Defensive Operations: are actions in which a state uses force against another state’s military 
assets to repel and limit damage from that state’s attacks to retain control of its territory and avoid 
having the other state impose its will upon it.   
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punishment while the defensive operations mentioned above are aimed at limiting 
damage.  Adams provides a nice summary of her theory that states,  
…because states are less vulnerable to conquest and less likely to attack one another      
in defense- and especially deterrence-dominant eras, it is not the case, as offensive 
realists claim, that states act aggressively to survive.  Neither is it the case, as 
defensive realist suggest, that states act aggressively only when their security is 
threatened… (Adams 78). 
 
Her comments here point to the idea that she believes defense and deterrence will allow a 
state to be more comfortable in the international system by providing greater security.  At 
the same time states need to remember that nonaggressive does not equate to safety 
(Adams 79). Adams’ deterrence and offensive-defensive time period argument provides 
an interesting take on the offense-defense conversation.   
 
IV. Polarity, The Offense-Defense Balance And War, Ted Hopf  
According to Ted Hopf, the offense-defense balance consists of three elements.  
The first is the Technical Offense-Defense Military Balance concerning the relative 
military advantages enjoyed by the offense or defense on the battlefield. The second 
element is the Cumulativity of Power Resources.  Hopf explains this as the relative 
availability of the resources that make military capability possible. The third element is 
the set of Strategic Beliefs held by the leaders of great powers regarding their relative 
concern for their reputation, or credibility (Hopf 477).   
More specifically, the Technical Offense and Defense Military Balance focuses 
on the idea that offensive and defensive advantages should be separated into tactical and 
strategic categories (Hopf 478).  Tactical offensive advantage, according to Hopf, is the 
ability to seize a piece of an enemy’s territory at less cost to oneself than it requires for 
the defender to protect it or retrieve it (Hopf 479).  A strategic offensive advantage, 
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according to Hopf, is the ability to seize and/or occupy as much of an enemy’s territory 
as is necessary to destroy its military potential at less cost to oneself than is required for 
the defender to protect its territory or retake it (Hopf 479).   
The Cumulativitiy of Power Resources investigates the “affect of the availability 
and extractability of power resources on the offense-defense theory” (Hopf 480).    
Available power resources, according to Hopf, are the material elements that constitute 
military and economic power in a given historical period (Hopf 485).  Inevitably, the 
resources of power and their geographical locations change over time.  For example, in 
the past states may have attacked the industrial sectors of their rivals to weaken their 
enemies’ economic safety.  Today, state actors focus more on attacking industries like 
petroleum and uranium deposits because of the powerful relevance of these resources 
(Hopf 486).  Hopf argues that the greater the relevance of another state’s resources to 
increasing ones own power, the greater the incentive to go to war.  This creates a 
situation in which the lower the costs of occupation and the more readily transferable the 
resources of power are the greater the instability and thus the higher chance of attack 
(Hopf 486). Inevitably, an establishment of this situation favors the offensive because it 
allows a state to gain an advantage and thus have a greater chance of successful attack.   
Finally, the Strategic Beliefs component discusses that the knowledge possessed 
by ruling elites of great nations about how the international system operates plays a role 
in the offense-defense paradigm.  According to Hopf, offensive strategic beliefs assume 
that rulers will be very concerned if they allow another state to gain a military victory 
anywhere in the international arena (Hopf 488). This victory can cause all actors in the 
system to “learn lessons about offense and defense” (Hopf 489). First, the rulers of 
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victorious states will believe that they can successfully challenge the positions of the 
recently defeated. Second, “the defeated state’s allies will begin to question the 
advisability of relying on the former’s security guarantees, given its recent record, and 
hence will tend to bandwagon with rather than balance against, any future efforts at 
expansion by the recent aggressor” (Hopf 489). The final lesson is that states, which are 
located in the neighborhood of the recent victor, will “fall like dominoes into the lap of 
the aggressor, rather than redoubling their efforts to balance against this ascendant threat” 
(Hopf 489). On the other hand, Hopf argues that defensive beliefs create rulers who are 
“unconcerned about their credibility, confident that allies will balance, not bandwagon, 
and that dominoes will not fall after their adversary’s victories” (Hopf 489).   
 Hopf’s three-element argument about the offense-defense theory continues to 
build on the original conversation that George Quester began in his book.  Hopf’s 
argument examines a wider range of possible reasons for offensive and defensive 
decisions made by a state while providing powerful insight into the offense-defense 
relationship in the international system.   
 
V. Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory, Stephen Biddle  
Stephen Biddle’s work on the offense-defense theory is extremely complex 
because of the uniqueness of his argument.  According to Biddle the “offense-defense 
balance” plays an important role across a wide range of modern international relations 
theory (Biddle 742).  The theory itself has been used to explain the causes of war, 
alliance formation, arms racing, crisis behavior, the size of states and the structure of the 
international system.  The widespread use of the offense-defense balance is fueled by the 
appeal that the balance makes sense on a military level.  Current theories, like the ones 
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explored above, focus on “how the military prospects for attack ought to affect the 
likelihood of aggression or that arms races should be more intense when technology is 
better suited for attack than defense” (Biddle 743).  Biddle argues that these current 
theories are “underspecified and problematic” (Biddle 743).  The previous theories focus 
entirely on the consequences of the balance, essentially examining what happens when 
the balance is tipped.   
Biddle has proposed a new theory of the offense-defense balance that is designed 
to overcome what he believes are the two shortcomings of the existing arguments.  The 
first shortcoming is “the current theories exclude a crucial class of causal variables”  
(Biddle 745).  There are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the 
existing theories reliance on structural material factors like force size, geography and 
especially technology is misplaced.  Therefore, according to Biddle, the new theory relies 
heavily on national strategic and tactical choices as the key determinants of the relative 
ease of attack and defense (Biddle 746). The second shortcoming discusses that the 
current theories of the “balance-as-effect are indeterminate” (Biddle 747).  The broad 
idea that geography, force size and patterns of diplomatic action can alter the offense-
defense balance provides a list of “independent variables”, but there is no mechanism for 
interrelating them (Biddle 750). Biddle argues that “the technology theory offers no 
operationally measurable specification: neither defense-conducive firepower nor offense-
conducive mobility has unambiguous referents and many technologies simultaneously 
increase both” (Biddle 751).    
Biddle, to counter these weaknesses creates new theory that concludes three major 
findings. First, his new theory implies that the security dilemma cannot be eliminated 
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from the offense-defense discussion.  Biddle believes that states cannot solely construct 
“defense-conducive military postures to defend themselves” (Biddle 769).  For states, the 
goal of being strictly defensive is unattainable.  Instead, Biddle concludes that states, in 
order to be secure, must “implement tactics that could also enable successful attacks 
against neighbors” (Biddle 768).  Second, the new theory implies a “higher frequency of 
future war than orthodox offense-defense theory” (Biddle 769).  According to Biddle, this 
stems from the above idea that the security-dilemma cannot be eliminated.  Essentially, 
the importance of force employment will lead to more situations in which war arises.  
Finally, Biddle’s new theory implies a “number of new directions for the investigation” 
(Biddle 770).  Biddle believes that the offense-defense theory will expand to explain “a 
host of important political outcomes” (Biddle 770).  He argues that the offense-defense 
theory will continue to be employed in the discussion of conflict but may also evolve to 
help explain larger political choices.   
Biddle’s argument focuses on the balance part of the offense-defense balance.  He 
provides a more systematic theory to explain the balance, which sheds new light on the 
wide variety of international relations theories that use it.  Biddle’s new theory of balance 
is important (Biddle 768).  He provides a new perspective on the theories of more 
orthodox positions about technology as the powerful variable in the offense-defense 
balance.   Biddle also argues that offense-defense distinctions do matter and must be 
taken into account to understand political outcomes.  The ability to attack and the ability 
to defend are not the same; they can and must be distinguished (Biddle 770).  
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The Israeli Security Barrier: Offensive or Defensive 
Before beginning a discussion about whether the Israeli security barrier is an 
offensive maneuver or defensive structure it is first necessary to briefly review the 
situation surrounding the barrier.  Officially, the security barrier is being built by a state-
actor (Israel) to stop a non-state actor (Palestinian’s) from infiltrating its borders. 
Unofficially, the barrier is also being built to create a permanent border between the 
Israeli state and the non-state Palestinian entity.  Either way, the offense-defense theories 
presented above focus solely on interactions between states in the international system 
that have the ability to engage each other in modern warfare.  Although the situation 
between the Palestinians and Israeli’s is not classified as a war, the conflict has  taken on 
many war like characteristics, which have created anoffense-defense struggle between the 
two entities.  Whether it has been Israel invading parts of the West Bank (offense), 
terrorist organizations bombing buses in Tel-Aviv (offense), or constant patrols by the 
Israeli Defense Force along the border of Israel, there has been a constant relevance of 
offense-defense theory throughout this conflict.  The new barrier, which has become the 
ultimate weapon of security for the Israeli state, is no different. Is the Israeli security 
barrier being built for offensive or defensive purposes?  The following provides an 
answer to this question through an examination of the relationship between the current 
theories of the offense-defense balance and the major debates surrounding the barrier.   
I. Barrier Technology  
Many theories surrounding the offense-defense argument focus on technology.  
Israeli society is famously known for its advancements in military as well as other types 
of technology.  The countries expertise in this area is shown through the incorporation 
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advanced into the creation of the security barrier.  Although the wall appears to be 
extremely simplistic, it is actually a complex militarized entity that provides intelligence 
and security to the country.  Most offense-defense theories place a large emphasis on the 
importance of advanced technology.  However, the difference between offensive and 
defensive use of said technology derives from the way in which the technology is 
employed.   
George Quester’s argument focuses heavily on the technology aspect and bases 
the divide between offense and defense on the mobility of weapons (the technology).  
Immobile weapons, according to Quester, are defensive because an attacker must travel 
to the weapon instead of having the weapons come to them. Therefore, these weapons are 
meant to protect the location of their fortified position. To this end, the wall becomes 
defensive, as there is nothing more immobile than miles of concrete wall and barbwire 
fence. If a battle over the wall were to occur it would take place at the wall, bringing the 
fight directly to Israeli border.   
Furthermore, Quester’s theory continues by pointing out that defensive strategy 
also relates to “peculiarities” of terrain.  By “peculiarities” Quester is referencing natural 
occurrences like mountains, rivers and jungle.  Although the barrier is not a naturally 
occurring structure, it can be argued that its construction has changed the natural 
landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian border forever, making the wall a part of the terrain 
and environment.  It is obvious that this new structure poses a physical security obstacle 
and thus favors the defensive.   
Stephen Biddle also makes an argument for technology.  Biddle believes that 
technology is always an offensive force but should be treated as an insignificant measure 
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because of the constant development of new technology.  More sophisticated technology 
will always allow for a more powerful offensive maneuver. Israeli technology surpasses 
the opposing Palestinian forces capabilities by incredible amounts, thus placing the wall 
in the offensive category.  As Israeli technology continues to change over the next few 
years there will continue to be more offensive gains through the use of this technology.   
II. The Route  
To date, the route of the Israeli Security Barrier continues to be one of the most 
contested issues surrounding the wall. The placement of the wall has been extremely 
strategic and done in a very particular way to secure certain Israeli interests, which 
include protecting settlements and important geographic locations.  For some, the 
ultimate goal of the wall is to separate the Israeli people from the Arabs in the West 
Bank, thus securing the Israeli state behind a physical blockade.  The route has every 
intention of accomplishing this goal and makes no concessions to the people living in the 
West Bank.  Deciding whether the route maneuvers are offensive or defensive is not a 
simple task.   
The theory of Ted Hopf would place the careful route planning as an offensive 
maneuver by the Israeli government. More specifically, Hopf’s Technical Offense and 
Defense Military Balance argument states, “…a strategic offensive advantage is the 
ability to seize and/or occupy as much of an enemy’s territory at less cost to oneself that 
is required for the defender to protect its territory or retake it (Hopf 479).”  According to 
this idea, the Israeli government is strategically removing land from the Palestinian entity 
because it has both the power and ability to do so. Although the international community 
believes the land belongs the Palestinians, the Israeli government is offensively claiming 
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this land as theirs by constructing a barrier on it. Furthermore, the Palestinian entity 
cannot do anything about this situation through defense, which creates a low cost 
offensive situation for the Israeli government.  
To further prove this, Hopf’s theory of Cumulativity of Power Resources can also 
be employed.  This theory admits that state actors, who are acting offensively, focus on 
attacking relevant resources.  Moreover, Hopf comments that the more important a 
resource is the more likely it will be attacked so that power can be removed from the 
enemy.  An examination of the ability of the wall to conveniently cut Palestinian farmers 
off from their farmland produces a result that supports Hopf’s argument.  In this instance, 
the security barrier plays a very dangerous offensive role by eliminating a food staple for 
the Palestinian population.  There is nothing more important or “relevant” than the 
agricultural staples of a society.  In this regard, the security barrier is being used as an 
offensive entity by the Israeli government by attacking the enemy through the removal of 
a resource.   
On the other hand, examining Karen Adam’s theory would place the calculated 
route in the defensive category. Her discussion of offense vs. defense eras provides 
evidence that the wall currently sits in a defensive state.  This is because Adam’s 
demonstrates that defense choices provide security through limitation of attacks.  By 
limiting access to Israel, the security barrier is working as a defensive tool.  Palestinian’s 
must cross through one of the designated border crossings where heavy screening and 
necessary identification is required to be admitted to Israel.  These specifically designed 
gateways that are placed strategically throughout the barrier enable the Israeli security 
forces to limit access to the state, which in turn works limit any type of attack.  
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According to Adams, the ability to remove a threat before it is created would be the 
ultimate defensive move. The barriers ability to accomplish this with extreme success 
provides support for the defensive nature of the wall.   
By investigating Stephen Biddle’s new theory that relies heavily on national 
strategic and tactical choices as the key determinants of the relative ease of attack and 
defense it can also be concluded that the route of the wall employs a defensive tactic. As 
stated above, the route of the wall is extremely strategic.  According to Biddle, strategic 
and national choices are taken in to account when a state is making military decisions.  
Offensive decisions will be ones that leave the state more vulnerable but ultimately have 
a high payoff.  Defensive decisions will come with less gain but higher levels of security.  
The route of the security barrier, according to this argument, would thus be a defensive 
decision by the Israeli state. The barrier accomplishes the state goal of creating stronger 
security through defensive measures.   
III. Suicide Terror  
As a non-state actor the terrorist organizations in Palestine have used suicide 
terror as their main offensive weapon against the Israeli state.  To stop these attacks, 
which have occurred at constant rates in past years, the Israeli government decided to 
build the security barrier.   The barrier allowed limits to be placed on the travel between 
the West Bank and Israel, which ultimately stopped the flow of terrorists across the 
border.   
Quester’s mobility argument that is discussed in his offense-defense theory 
suggests that the terrorist organizations are using offensive techniques to target the Israeli 
people.  Although the suicide bombs do not fall under the title of conventional warfare 
 43 
tactics that Quester uses to support his argument, it can still be concluded that the 
mobility of the terrorist makes the action purely offensive.  To combat this offensive 
tactic used by the terrorist organizations, Israel must employ a defensive policy to remove 
the threat of attack.  Quester, through his discussion of the “minefield” presented earlier 
in this chapter, provides evidence of how the wall can act as this defensive barrier.  He 
states,  “If a well-planned minefield imposes heavy casualties on an army trying to attack 
a fortified machine gun nest, this is a technology that discourages taking the offensive 
and reinforces the defense” (Quester 6). Although the wall does not impose death to a 
suicide bomber, it does significantly stifle the capabilities and success of the attack.  The 
need to cross a concrete barrier that is monitored by cameras, motion detectors and 
constant soldier patrol creates a figurative “minefield” for suicide bombers that destroys 
their plans of attack.  According to this argument, the once permeable border of Israel is 
now a fortified defensive entity aimed at defending Israel’s citizens from attacking 
forces.   
To counter the defense argument in this situation, Karen Adam’s would focus on 
her offense-dominant era theory. This theory’s core message is that forces are more likely 
to concede as a response to greater military threat from the opposing side.  Dealing with 
suicide bombers is a hard phenomenon to tackle because of the relative ease with which 
bombers can disguise themselves and their deadly weapons.  Prior to the construction of 
the barrier a bomber had the ability to cross into Israel undetected, making it incredibly 
easy for their mission to become a success.  Today, a bomber is much more likely to 
concede his mission when faced with an eight foot wall complete with motion sensors 
and barbed wire.  According to Adam’s, the threat of getting caught by the Israeli 
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Defense Forces coupled with the new challenges and difficulty of navigating an advanced 
set of barriers provides Israel with an offensive advantage over the attacking bomber.  
This situation creates the opportunity for Israel to demonstrate its supreme power over 
the bombers by threatening them with new obstacles.   
Another offensive argument about the barriers role in stopping suicide terror can 
be connected with the theory of Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z Haftel, and Kevin McSweeney.   
These theorists argue that when countries “generate incentives for preemptive strikes and 
preventive measures” (Gortzak et al. 72) there is a shift towards the offensive.  From 
Israel’s standpoint there are numerous reasons to prevent suicide attacks from happening 
within the country.  First and foremost is the necessity of the state to provide security to 
its citizens.  Preemptively removing a threat to the Israeli citizens by hindering the 
attackers abilities to enter the country is an easy and powerful way to provide security.  
According to Gortzak, et al. if a suicide bomber does not have the opportunity to detonate 
his bomb on Israeli soil because of the preventative and preemptive measures in place, 
the barrier is essentially serving its purpose as an offensive weapon. 
V. Deterrence 
It is necessary to stop and examine a third idea that deals with neither offense nor 
defense.  Instead, a brief discussion of the deterrence theory will provide additional 
insight into the strategic point of the barrier.  Karen Adam’s discussed the deterrence 
balance phenomenon in her writings.  She provides a definition of what is called a 
“deterrent operation” as “actions in which a state prepares to use force or demonstrates its 
ability to use force to attack another states nonmilitary assets to deter that state from 
attacking it or to deter if from further attacks once a war has begun” (Adams79).  The 
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Israeli security barrier, in some ways, can be seen as a demonstration of Israeli 
capabilities and thus act as a deterrent to opposing forces.  The barrier, regardless of its 
purpose, is a strong reminder of the superiority of the Israeli economy and military.   
In his book “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” Brent Sterling presents an 
argument about barriers as deterrents.  He states that,  
Barriers exacerbation of adversary hostility raises the importance of their 
deterrent potential.  In contrast to the more commonly used deterrence by 
punishment approach of threatening unacceptable retaliation, states aim for 
strategic defenses to facilitate deterrence by denial through convincing an 
adversary that its objective is not obtainable, at least not at an acceptable cost or 
risk (Sterling 315).  
 
According to Sterling’s statement, the Israeli security barrier would be a deterrent to any 
threats because it denies terrorist the ability to achieve their goal.  The ideas put forth in 
this section from Sterling hold true for the Israeli security barrier.  The barrier creates an 
incredibly difficult obstacle for terrorists who are trying to infiltrate Israel. In fact, the 
barrier denies terrorist the ability to carry out attacks because of the low probability 
terrorist have at crossing through the barrier.  Figuring out a way to bypass or get through 
the barrier would cost a lot of time, energy and money.  Therefore, the barrier creates 
unacceptable costs and risks for terrorists who now choose to refrain from attempting 
suicide terror on the Israeli state.  
George Quester provides further support for this deterrent phenomenon when he 
discusses the effect of World War I on the offense-defense theory.  He writes, “…the 
costs of testing a prepared defensive position were now obviously great; if repeated tests 
were required before an offensive breakthrough occurred, many nations might lack the 
desire to attempt these tests in the future” (Quester 114-115).  In order for terrorists to 
successfully gain access to Israel for their attacks they would have to repeatedly attempt 
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to figure out a possible way to get in to the state.  These attempts would result in 
numerous consequences, including arrest and imprisonment, which may outweigh the 
rewards of the end goal.  Moreover, the time spent working to figure out a solution to 
accessing Israel may be time better spent figuring out another offensive tactic.  These 
results would ultimately deter terrorists from continuing to attack Israel through suicide 
terror.   
 The idea that the Israeli security barrier is in actuality acting as a deterrent adds a 
new piece to this complicated equation.  The deterrent theory, although strong, does not 
provide enough concrete support to make a viable argument for deterrence as the main 
military and political goal of the barrier.  It is true that the barrier was erected to deter 
terrorists from committing attacks on Israel. It is also true that the barrier has 
accomplished its goal in deterring terrorists by placing a major obstacle between them 
and their target.  If the security barrier was only constructed to stop terrorists from 
entering Israel then deterrence would have applied in this situation.  However, it is 
important to remember that many people believe the barrier is not only about stopping 
suicide terror. Acknowledging the notion that the barrier has other political goals creates 
an argument for the structure as an offensive or defensive entity and not a deterrent.   
Conclusion: Is the Best Defense a Good Offense? 
After examining the current theories surrounding the offense-defense controversy, 
it is apparent that the Israeli security barrier cannot be classified as solely an offensive or 
defensive entity.  Each aspect of the barrier that has been examined in this chapter can be 
interpreted using both the offensive and the defensive.  For example, the route of the 
barrier is offensive in nature because its construction near Palestinian farms removes a 
 47 
relevant resource from the Palestinians.  On the other hand, the wall itself has defensive 
tendencies because of its immobile nature. Furthermore, the evaluation of suicide terror 
showed an offensive purpose of the barrier through the use of preventative and 
preemptive tactics.  This exploration has provided an illustration that shows how all parts 
of this barrier are interconnected.  Each concrete block or chain-linked fence serves an 
offensive or defensive purpose.   
If the conclusion here is that the barrier is neither offensive nor defensive why 
does the investigation of this topic even matter? It is necessary to examine the offensive 
and defensive components of this barrier in order to further understand the decision to 
create such a wall. Leaving the legality issue out of the conversation, the above 
investigation provides strong justification for the creation of this security barrier as a 
means to stop suicide terror. As a state, Israel has the right to defend its borders and 
citizens.  Moreover, Israel has the right to take offensive actions against those who 
choose to attack its borders.  The security barrier accomplishes both while simultaneously 
limiting the loss of Israeli human life.   
The above investigation also provides insight into other motives behind the 
construction of the wall.  A very deliberate point of the wall is to incorporate key 
settlement blocks and pieces of the West Bank into Israel.  This policy, which can be seen 
as both offensive and defensive, gains more credibility with the employment of the 
offense-defense theory.  Interpreting the decision of the Israeli government to carve out 
certain sections of the West Bank with the barrier from an offensive or defensive 
perspective removes criticism about Israel’s and establishes a greater understanding of 
the need for certain choices and decisions to be made.  Offensively, the Israeli 
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government believes that incorporating this land into Israel will further weaken the 
Palestinian entity and thus provide Israel with a stronger and more powerful nation. 
Defensively, the Israeli government feels the need to control this land so that it can 
continue to stop terrorists from violently attacking citizens. In this way, the offense-
defense theory is extremely important to the case of the Israeli security barrier and must 
not be overlooked. The offense-defense theory helps to provide a powerful understanding 
of the Israel security barrier and the complexity surrounding it.   
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Chapter III: Security or Separation?  
Carl Von Clausewitz, a German military theorist who stressed the moral and 
political aspects of war, famously wrote, “War is the continuation of policy by other 
means” (War 2000).  The separation barrier built in the West Bank during the past decade 
undoubtedly serves as part of a war to stop terrorist from infiltrating the Israeli borders.  
However, is the war on terror the only war in which the separation fence serves to fight?  
In his book Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors Brent L. Sterling writes that 
“barriers not only present the least politically painful course of action but they also 
remove the incentive to pursue changes that would improve long-term security prospects” 
(Sterling 325). This chapter will seek to confirm or deny this theory in the case of the 
Israeli security barrier by addressing the notion that the security fence has been built in 
order to implement other policies of the Israeli government.     
I. “Buying Time” 
Brent Sterling’s theory pinpoints an incredibly important topic that surrounds 
security barriers.  In order to fully understand the implications of this theory in the Israeli 
case it is necessary to first examine the idea behind Sterling’s argument. Sterling argues 
that strategic defenses cannot completely eliminate an adversarial threat, so decision 
makers have always sought to reduce their vulnerability by constructing strategic barriers 
that either “buy time” or allow a state to “operate proactively” in a safer environment 
(Sterling 324). Although these two ideas make sense, Sterling argues that historical 
evidence proves that both of these motivations can entail dangerous long-term 
consequences.  
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Sterling’s research shows that the far more common circumstance by decision 
makers involves states attempting to “buy time” through the construction of a strategic 
defense system.  Decision makers may seek to “buy time” for contrasting reasons.  First, 
states may desire an accommodation but lack a viable negotiating partner. For example, 
Israel in the late 1960s had to wait for Egyptian president Nasser’s departure from office 
before a diplomatic resolution of its disputes with Egypt would be possible (Sterling 
125).  Second, officials may want to undertake an offensive position against the enemy 
but need to build up strength.  Yu Zijun in the early 1740s stressed to Ming emperor 
Chenghua that the Yansui wall would allow the local area to recover sufficiently to 
facilitate the much-desired seizure of the Ordos region (Sterling 124).  Finally, leaders 
may just aim to “perpetuate defensive security” (Sterling 325).  The French army built 
the Maginot Line to help protect the northeastern frontier and enable broader security 
until such a time arrived that alternative defense measures could be employed (Sterling 
218).     
Regardless of the reason, barriers provide this breathing space by favorably 
shifting the previously mentioned offense-defense balance while simultaneously 
establishing a sense of being safe.  Such perceptions are critical given that they drive 
public and elite attitudes and thus, ultimately, policy choice.  Sterling writes, “the 
potential for perceptions of security to deviate sharply from reality exists given the likely 
significant degree of uncertainty over a state’s true security unless actually involved in a 
military engagement” (Sterling 326).  Achieving a sense of safety is a vital component of 
any political leader’s duty and requires a favorable interpretation of the situation on the 
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ground leading officials to stress, if not exaggerate, barrier strength.  These “public 
relations” campaigns have been a staple of strategic defense efforts (Sterling 325).   
The enhanced perception of security produced by the construction of a strategic 
defense system, however, tends to undermine the pursuit of a fundamental, longer-lasting 
solution to the adversarial relationship.  In particular, unpopular political, economic and 
military changes are unlikely to occur as the pressure to undertake them is relieved by the 
barrier (Seguin 7).  The Ming dynasty provides the foremost example.  The Great Wall, 
even if not providing perfect security, was sufficient to forgo a politically and culturally 
unwanted embrace of the concessions necessary for an accommodation with the Mongols 
or to adopt the major economic and military reforms necessary to obtain better fighting 
capability. Eventually, this would ultimately prove disasters for the Ming dynasty.  The 
misconception that the Great Wall could prevent full attack caused the Ming dynasty to 
become complacent with their armed forces. Although the Mongolians never successfully 
broke through the wall, the Manchus did.  The Manchus crossed the Great Wall in 1644 
and soon after seized Beijing, toppling the Ming Dynasty and establishing the Qing 
Dynasty (Sterling 226).     
Plato once wrote that “walls…tempt men to relax their guard and to trust to the 
false security provided by ramparts and bars” (War 2000).  Sterling would argue that 
Plato should have added that the passage “of time exacerbates this effect” (Sterling 326).  
As a result, the goal of “buying time” with strategic defenses tends to morph into a policy 
of “muddling through” that entails increasing danger (Sterling 327). Initially, the barrier 
enhances the security of the state, but over time, it can be argued, that security is broken 
down and becomes weaker. It can be argued that a highly motivated foe aggressively 
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searches for counters to the physical, static structure. Eventually means emerge that, 
along with the fortifications deterioration, decrease a strategic defense’s contribution to 
security.  The longer this search takes without aggression or at least successful attacks, 
the stronger the perceptions of security become among decision makers and the broader 
public.   
According to Sterling, the tendency toward “muddling through” with an 
increasing sense of security suggests long-term peril of efforts to “buy time.”  However, 
rising powers that act more aggressively, feeling liberated by their reduced vulnerability, 
have also found danger (Sequin 9).  As a result of strategic defense systems, decision 
makers are more willing to take positions and actions with great risk in pursuit of further 
shifting the power balance in their directions.  An example of this is seen through the 
Athenian’s behavior during the Second Peloponnesian War.  The Athenian’s believed 
that they were protected well enough to send out a lightweight force of twenty ships on 
an expedition to Sicily.  Lasting from 415 BC to 413 BC, this expedition would 
ultimately cause a crucial turning point in the Peloponnesian War.  Upon arriving in 
Sicily, the Athenian force was met with crippling attacks.  Eventually, Athens sent two 
hundred ships and thousands of soldiers to aid the suffering men who could not fight the 
armies in Sicily.  This contingency of fighters was mostly lost in a single battle near 
Sicily.  While this battle took place, Athens enemies on land were encouraged to take 
action, breaking through Athens security defense systems and ultimately destroying the 
state.  Athens false sense of security allowed it to make decisions that would have 
bolstered the states power if successful but instead the idea of being completely secure 
caused widespread destruction (Sterling 35-37).   
 53 
Security defense systems are much more complex than they appear to be. On the 
surface, these barriers act as agents of security that protect citizens of one state from 
outside forces of an adversary.  While these barriers initially serve the purpose of 
fulfilling a security niche, overtime the security system creates and dictates other policies.  
Whether this is a policy of buying time or a policy of separation, security barriers 
influence the actions of a state. To a similar extent, the Israeli security barrier has 
evolved.  The barrier has now become about borders, not security.  The barrier has 
effectively prevented Israel from making concessions necessary to find a long-term 
sustainable solution with the Palestinian entity. For Israel, finding a long-term solution to 
the conflict would result in a better security outcome than any barrier will ever achieve. 
Israel has not failed to adapt its military or take new unnecessary risks but it has used the 
security barrier to enforce political goals “in the least politically painful way” (Sterling 
325).   
The Case of the Israeli Security Barrier 
The investigation of the above theories relevance to the Israel security barrier will 
deal heavily with the discussion of the current route of the barrier.  The route of the 
fence, as approved by the government, is based primarily on the Israeli Supreme Court 
decision in June 2004, which ruled out the route of the fence West of Jerusalem on the 
argument that it didn't satisfy the required balance between Israel’s security needs and the 
daily needs of the Palestinian population. To fully explore if the Israeli security barrier is 
“the least politically painful course of action” for the Israeli government, this section will 
first examine public opinion surrounding the barrier and then will dissect different Israeli 
political actions that contradict the main security goal of the barrier.   
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I. Public Opinion 
Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked completed a study in 2007 called The People 
Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security.  This study examined numerous 
issues surrounding Israeli National Security, including the security barrier (Meir 2007).  
According to the report, Israeli public opinion has been strongly in favor of the barrier, 
partly in the hope that it will improve security and partly in the belief that the barrier 
marks the eventual borders of a Palestinian state.  According to a Haaretz article 
published in 2005, a survey conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research 
at Tel Aviv University found that eighty-four percent of the Jewish population of Israel 
supports the barrier (Harel 2).  Most Israeli’s believe the barrier, and intensive activity by 
the IDF, to be the main factors in the decrease of successful suicide attacks from the West 
Bank.  The proponents of the barrier insist that reversible inconveniences to Palestinians 
should be balanced with the threats to the lives of Israeli civilians and point out that the 
barriers is a non-violent way to stop terrorism and save innocent lives (Chen 28).   
There are some Israelis who oppose the barrier. The settler movement opposes the 
barrier, although this opposition has waned since it became clear that the barrier would be 
diverted to the east of major Israeli settlements such as Ariel (Arieli 2). Many Israelis 
living in settlements, such as Gush Etzion, oppose the fence because it separates them 
from the rest of Israel.  They argue that building the fence defines a border, and that they 
are being left out.  According to most settlers, all of the West Bank belongs to Israel and 
separating any of it with a fence is the first step in giving the land away.    
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Colonel Shaul Arieli, who was the last commander of the Gaza regional brigade 
of the IDF, also opposes the barrier because he believes that the effects of the barrier will 
only be short-term.  He stated,  
The fence provides a partial security response to the terror threats and a good 
response to prevention of illegal immigration and prevention of criminal 
acts…but on the other hand in its current format it creates the future terror 
infrastructure because this terror infrastructure is precisely those people living in 
enclaves who will support acts of terror as the only possible tool that they 
perceive as being able to restore them the land, production sources and water 
wells taken from them (Arieli 3).     
 
Arieli also argues that the barrier is designed to induce the Arabs of the border region to 
leave so that Israel can expand (Arieli 3).  
The barrier has come under large criticism from those who oppose it.  On August 
17
th
, 2005 the Israeli Newspaper Haaretz said of the barrier “Sharon has tried in vain to 
describe it as ‘only another counterterrorism measure.’  Nevertheless, it looks like a 
border and behaves like one, with barbed wire, electronic devices, concrete walls, 
watchtowers and checkpoints.  Its creation set a crucial precedent in the unilateral 
division of the land, which came to fit Sharon perfectly” (Ben 2005). Yossi Klein Halevy, 
Israeli correspondent for The New Republic, writes of the barrier that “building over the 
green line, by contrast, reminds Palestinians that every time they’ve rejected 
compromise—whether in 1937, 1947, or 2000—the potential map of Palestine shrinks… 
The fence is a warning: If Palestinians don’t stop terrorism and forfeit their dream of 
destroying Israel, Israel may impose its own map on them… and, because Palestine isn’t 
being restored but invented, its borders are negotiable” (Halevy 3).  This quote by Halevy 
demonstrates that the intentions of the security barrier are in actuality aimed at 
establishing a de facto border with the main goal of separating Israel from Palestine.   
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Regardless of these opponents, the construction of the security fence continues to 
enjoy massive support among the Jewish population.  Indeed, it is hard to find any issue 
in Israel about which these is so wide a consensus: Eighty percent in 2004, eighty-two 
percent in 2005, seventy-nine percent in 2006, seventy-six percent in 2007 supported the 
construction of the fence (Meir 2007).  In the context of a question relating to the various 
proposals on the route of the fence, eighty-one percent in 2005, senvety-five percent in 
2006, and seventy-eight percent in 2007 disagreed with the statement that “the fence 
should not have been constructed at all” (Meir 2007).  Respondents were also asked in 
under certain circumstances (e.g. no possibility of political progress with the Palestinians 
and a resurgence of terrorism in the territories) would they agree that Israel declare the 
fence as its permanent border.  A clear majority was in favor in 2005 (fifty-seven percent) 
and in 2006 (sixty percent) (Meir 2007).  However, by 2007 the Jewish population was 
evenly split on the issue: forty-nine percent in favor and fifty-one percent opposed (Meir 
2007).   
An examination of Israeli public opinion surrounding the security barrier 
demonstrates the complex situation that is created when building a security system.  The 
massive support for the fence is primarily interpreted as Israeli preoccupation with 
security concerns and with the need to combat terrorism, specifically suicide bombers.  
Israel’s initial success in limiting suicide attempts created a sense of complete security 
amongst Israeli citizens.  This allowed the Israeli government to continue to construct the 
fence with public support.  However, the findings above support the claim that the Israeli 
public understands that the fence now has a deeper, more political meaning.  This change 
signifies tthat most Israelis have come to realize the answer to the conflict lies in 
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separation between Israeli and Palestinians.  The above findings demonstrate the paradox 
that has been established surrounding this wall.  Public opinion reflects the goals of the 
state and in this case portrays the understanding that the Israeli government is employing 
the security barrier as a tool for the establishment of a final Israeli border.  More than 
this, Israeli public opinion shows that even with public controversy over the support of 
the wall, Israel would rather deal with having citizens who may be against the wall than 
work towards peace with Palestine.  The above findings allow one to conclude that the 
public understands that the barrier was initially built for security purposes but is now 
being used for very specific political implications.   
II.  Political Action 
This thesis has shown and proven that the security barrier was initially built as a 
response to security threat against the everyday lives of the residents of Israel. The 
personal security of Israeli residents and the low price Israel paid during the first two 
decades of its control of the territories helped maintain uncertainty regarding the political 
future of these territories and allowed Israel to avoid establishing definitive borders.  The 
first and second intifadas dramatically changed this and gave rise to the idea of physical 
separation as part of Israel’s political goal for the territories (Arieli 8). Yitzhak Rabin, as 
prime minister, said that he “regards the separation issue as a central topic” (Benn 1995).   
Similarly, Ehud Barak saw separation as “a supreme national need of demography, 
identity and Israeli democracy.  Barak coined the concept of “we are here and they are 
there.”  In fact, just before Ariel Sharon replaced him as prime minister, Barak stated, 
“Ultimately, the only path for Israel is separation from the Palestinians—if possible via 
an accord, and if this turn out to be impossible, the via a measured and proportional 
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security separation initiative”(Edilist 442).  Sharon echoed this sentiment when he stated, 
“I believed and hoped that we would be able to hold on forever…but the changing reality 
in the country, in the region and in the world, required me to adopt a different assessment 
and changes in positions” (Sharon 2005).    
The policy regarding the path of the fence is already a complex story.  It was 
Tsipi Livni, serving as minister or Justice, who expressed this in the clearest way possible 
when she said that the separation fence would constitute “the future border of the State of 
Israel,” and that “the High Court is drawing the borders of the state via its rulings on the 
fence” (Chen 36).  Barak too, when serving as minister of defense in the government of 
Ehud Olmert, noted that “when we build a fence it is clear that there are areas that are 
beyond the fence, and it is clear that in the permanent accord…these areas that are 
beyond the fence will not be part of the State of Israel” (Radio 2007).  Moreover, Prime 
Minister Sharon, the “father of the route,” claimed in regard to the objective of the fence 
route “…Palestinians should have understood that what they did not receive today, it 
might be impossible to give them tomorrow” (Bakor Nir 2003). He also emphasized that 
“the demographic consideration played an important role in determining the route of the 
separation fence due to the fear of annexing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who 
would join the Arab of Israel” (Benn 2005).  Olmert, Sharon’s successor, could only 
reiterate: “The direction is clear, we are moving toward separation from the Palestinians, 
toward the demarcation of a permanent border of Israel” (Kham 2006).   Through these 
quotes it is made clear that the route of the fence thus has political objectives in regard to 
permanent borders between the State of Israel and Palestine.  Israel’s political goals are 
reflected as the annexation of the areas beyond the Green Line where most of the Israeli 
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settlers live, while maintaining the existing demographic proportion between Jews and 
non-Jews (Chen 40).   
Furthermore, the decision about the route of the fence to cross deep into the 
territory of the West Bank came under fire from the international community at large.  In 
order to defend against these attacks Israel employed the use of the IDF as well as the 
High Court of Petitions Department of the State Prosecutors office.  According to Israeli 
law, only the IDF, which represents all of the government authorities in the occupied 
territory, is permitted to violate the basic rights of the Palestinian residents.  By defining 
the fence “as an essential security need” and by issuing temporary “expropriation orders” 
for land required for building the fence the government of Israel was able to justify 
building such a wall (Arieli 6).   The government sufficed with Sharon’s letter to 
President G. Bush in which he declared “…the fence is a security barrier and not a 
political one, temporary and not permanent, and thus will not affect the issues of the 
permanent accord, including the definition of final borders” (Sharon 2004).   
The IDF did not plan the route of the barrier but they did become the party 
responsible for construction and monitoring.  Moreover, it was the IDFs duty to ensure 
that the barrier was being created for security purposes and thus that route of the barrier 
reflected this policy.  Initially, the IDF maintained this stance and worked to ensure a 
strict policy of security (Chen 43).  However, the IDF did not remain consistent with this 
policy and even forfeited its professional view, which establishes that the IDF cannot act 
in the Palestinian territories for political reasons.   The Israeli High Court explains this 
view in more depth when it states:  
In regard to the authority of the military commander to build the security fence in 
the area, it was determined in accordance with the laws of belligerent occupation 
 60 
that the military commander is entitled to order, based upon military 
considerations, the construction of a separation fence in the area of Judea and 
Samaria … This authority arises only when the fundamental reason for building 
the fence is a security-military one. The military commander is not authorized to 
order the construction of a security fence if the reasons for it are political. The 
security fence cannot derive from motives of annexing land from the area to the 
State of Israel. The objective of the separation fence cannot be the demarcation of 
a political border (HCJ 2056/04).   
 
The IDF is solely a military force aimed at securing and protecting its citizens.  It may 
work to build a security fence if the purpose is strictly security.  According to the court, 
once the IDF concedes to political motives it is no longer acting under its jurisdiction. In 
many cases surrounding the barrier the IDF did in fact fail to uphold its professional 
standards and  “subordinated to political considerations that are unrelated to security”  
(Arieli 7).    
More specifically, the IDF was mobilized and politically encouraged to defend the 
fence route, which served as a component in the battle to implement a policy that was 
essentially political rather than security-based. The IDF even sacrificed security needs 
“on the altar of internal political considerations” (Chen 47).  For example, Supreme Court 
President Beinisch ruled in the Bil'in-Modi'in Ilit case:  
It seems that in light of the desire to ensure the construction of the eastern 
neighborhood in the future, the fence route was drawn in a place that has no 
security advantage. The current route of the fence also raises questions pertaining 
to the security advantage it offers. It is clear that the route mainly traverses 
territory that is topographically inferior, both vis-à-vis Modi'in Ilit and vis-à-vis 
Bil'in. It leaves a number of hills on the Palestinian side and two hills on the 
Israeli side. It endangers the forces patrolling along the route. Against the 
background of the security outlook presented to us in many other cases, according 
to which there is security importance in building the fence in topographically 
dominant areas, the existing route raises questions. In general, in many cases of 
planning the fence route, the military commander presents the occupation of 
dominant hills as a significant security advantage, while in the case before us a 
route was drawn that is at least partly located in inferior territory in relation to the 
hills (HCJ 8414/05). 
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When examining the fence route approved in October 2003, it is evident that the 
barrier was planned in a way that would include a maximum of Palestinian lands---
without the homes of the landowners (Arieli 8).  It is clear that the accumulation of 
territory came at the expense of the security.  The following declaration can be found on 
the Ministry of Defense’s website:  
With the goal of enabling agricultural work, maintaining uninterrupted movement 
between the villages and cities, and ensuring access to municipal, sanitation and 
social services between the villagers and the district city along the fence, many 
passages were established for the Palestinians to use.  In this framework, 37 gates 
have been built so far (out of a total of 53) for the passage of farmers who are 
residents of nearby villages, 34 control points…(MOD 2003) 
 
IDF forces are now employed with the task of operating dozens of these agricultural 
gates, which allow Palestinians access to their lands that remained beyond the fence.  The 
state itself argued in affidavits submitted to the High court that “every passage point 
increases the danger of infiltration by terrorist into Israel and constitutes a point of 
friction that intensifies the risk to the defense forces assigned to the passage point”  (HCJ 
4289/05). Instead of excluding most of the Palestinian lands from Israel wherever 
possible, the state separated the lands from their owners.  Therefore, they were forced to 
build many gates that constitute a security threat because of increased movement between 
Palestine and Israel.  This simultaneously tied down the elite forces required to operate 
these fences (Arieli 10).   Furthermore, this new “friction” created more incentive for 
Palestinian’s to defy Israel, essentially motivating the Palestinians to find new ways to 
fight against the state or overcome the security barrier.   
The IDF also contradicted itself by adopting routes that it had completely rejected 
during earlier route planning stages.  It can be argued this was done in order to fulfill the 
political objective of the route. The most blatant case is that of Ma’alei Adumim (Arieli 
 62 
10-11). The southern part of the fence route, first published in February 2005, was 
supposed to include both the settlement of Kedar and the caravan site adjacent to it. 
During the High Court discussions in this case, state representatives presented 
“alternatives” for the fence route that had been created by political officials.  The IDF, 
who strongly disagreed with these routes, presented a different route that provided the 
highest security advantage. An IDF representative described the implications of the 
alternative route plan that they initially strongly rejected:  
If this alternative were to be implemented, it would be necessary to traverse the 
deep and steep riverbed described above. This crossing would constitute a very 
problematic route from the operational, security and engineering perspective 
because it would create a particularly circuitous route with sharp side slopes and 
longitudinal slopes that are borderline in terms of the criteria for planning a patrol 
from the security perspective. Part of the route traverses hilly terrain that is also 
inferior from an operational perspective. Due to the side slopes, the exposed 
crossing and the bisection of the Abu Hindi valley, there would also be very 
severe harm to the landscape. In addition, the cost of executing this route would 
be particularly high … In light of the above, it was found that from an 
engineering, security and operational perspective, this alternative cannot be 
accepted (Chen 50).    
  
The High Court, in 2005, did not rule on the case and asked the IDF to resubmit a 
proposal.  
After a year and a half of delays in submitting a new plan for the route, the IDF 
returned with a proposal that completely matched one of the state created “alternatives” 
that it had “examined” and rejected in 2005 (Arieli 11). In the state’s written response in 
December 2006, backed by a security affidavit from the chief of staff of the Central 
Command at the time, an IDF representative addressed the implications of this alternative 
and stated that bisecting the Abu Hindi valley that separates Kedar and Ma’alei Adumim 
would in fact give the IDF a security advantage in this area (Arieli 11).  Without 
question, this decision came after major Israeli political figures placed large amounts of 
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pressure on the IDF.  This case demonstrates the heavy political influence surrounding 
the wall.  The IDF, which acts as the main security entity for the state of Israel, altered its 
expert opinion so that the political goals of land inclusion could be attained.   
Moreover, Israel employed security arguments to justify the political fence route 
that ended up being completely false.  One extreme example of this was the contradiction 
between the state’s response to the petition against the fence route in Gush Etzion and the 
response to the petitions against the “permits regime” (Chen 52).  In the first petition, the 
state’s representatives sought to defend the fence route, which enclosed five Palestinian 
villages in the area between Gush Etzion and Jerusalem by exempting their 20,000 
Palestinian residents, and all others in the West Bank, from the need for entry and exit 
permits, because they assumed that the High Court would not allow them to operate the 
“permits regime”  5  in such a large area and for such a large population.  The petition 
stated that, “It should be emphasized and declared that the entry of any person to the 
Gush Etzion area will not be prevented (even people who have security restrictions), 
subject to a security check. This entry will not require an entry permit […],” the state 
promised (Arieli 12).   
Less than four months later, the attorneys already wrote the opposite when 
instructing the IDF: 
There is a rational and direct connection between closing the territory of the seam 
zone and establishing a permits regime, on the one hand, and the security need, on 
the other hand. Restricting entry only to those who have a real personal 
connection to this area and making this entry conditional on receiving a permit 
that requires an individual security check, very significantly limits the possibility 
of terrorists crossing the security fence and subsequently entering Israel to carry 
out attacks (HCJ 639/04).   
                                                        
5
 The permits regime required a Palestinian who wished to enter or stay in the seam zone (the area 
between the fence and the Green Line) to present a permit from the Civil Administration based on 
proof that he is a resident of the place or owns land or a business in the seam zone.  
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In the first petition, the attorneys attacked the proposal by the Council for Peace and 
Security, which proposed an alternative fence route. The state’s representatives argued 
that “the Palestinians who cultivate the fields in these lands would be forced in practice to 
transition to a permits regime. It is clear that this entails a drastic change for the worse in 
the daily lives of these residents” (HCJ 639/04).  In the second petition,,the permits 
regime does not in fact cause a “drastic change for the worse.”  According to the petition, 
the great benefit in closing the territory, while establishing a permits regime in parallel, is 
proportional in regard to the difficulties that are caused to the local residents. In the first 
petition, the defense establishment showed generosity and announced, “goods from the 
east and the south of the fence” could move into the Gush Etzion.  And in the second 
petition, it explained why this exact same thing, as requested by the petitioners, could not 
be implemented (HCJ 639/04).  Although the second petition may seem security based in 
nature it does in fact represent a transition from concern with security to a concern with 
Palestinian gains.  While the first petition gives Palestinian’s some freedom, the second 
petition removes these freedoms by claiming that the security of the state is at risk. In 
actuality, the Israeli government is attempting to politically limit the abilities of the 
Palestinians to move [freely] into Israel.     
Through speeches, court cases, and petitions, it has become extremely clear that 
the barrier is about much more than security.  There is a large amount of political 
complexity surrounding the construction of this barrier.  Israeli politicians, army 
personnel and state-sponsored lawyers have all openly admitted that this barrier 
represents a separation from those on the other side.  The information above provides 
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concrete evidence to support the fact that Israel has established a powerful political 
barrier.   
Conclusion 
“…Barriers not only present the least politically painful course of action but they 
also remove the incentive to pursue changes that would improve long-term security 
prospects” (Sterling 325). Statistics dictate that the security barrier is in fact making 
Israeli citizens safer.  The decline in terrorist attacks over the last ten years is astonishing 
as there have been close to zero successful attacks within the state since the completion 
of large parts of the wall.  However, is the Israeli security barrier only about security?   
The above information directs the answer, undoubtedly, to be no. According to 
both Israeli public opinion and an examination of Israeli political action since the creation 
of the barrier, it seems that the Israeli political system has used the security “excuse” to 
essentially cover up for other motives behind the wall. Besides security, the barrier seems 
to be acting as the “least politically painful course of action” for the Israeli government.  
Instead of politically separating themselves from the West Bank through comprehensive 
negotiations, Israeli policy makers have chosen to hide behind what some argue is a 
“separation wall.”  The information above makes it clear that the barrier has much deeper 
political meaning, which includes the possibility of the barrier acting as a final border for 
the Israeli state.  Moreover, the barrier is removing any and all possibilities of an 
improvement of “long term security prospects.”  The only way to ensure the citizens of 
Israel are completely safe is to come to a peace arrangement with the Palestinians.   The 
Palestinian governing entity has made it extremely clear that the barrier must not 
continue to be erected if the Israeli’s wish to come to a peace agreement.  Construction of 
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the barrier has stifled any negotiations for peace, especially dealing with a conversation 
about a two-state solution, making “long term security prospects” an unattainable goal. 
The security barrier has been established by the Israeli government as a failing substitute 
for comprehensive bilateral agreements between Israel and Palestine as well as the 
establishment of a peace treaty between the two entities.  The ability of the Israeli 
government to remove the possibility of normal relations will inevitably have 
consequences for both Israel and Palestine.  Palestinians, who see the wall as unjust and 
illegal, will continue to struggle as they are cut off from the rest of the world.  More 
importantly, frustrated Palestinians may indeed turn to violence as a solution to their 
problems. Palestinians will look for ways to bypass the barrier and use terror and 
violence when they arrive on the other side.  In fact, the very barrier that was constructed 
to stop violence against the state of Israel may actually increase it.   The state of Israel 
has masked their political goals behind a security barrier that stands for much more then 
it may seem.  It is clearly apparent that the “security” barrier is becoming less about 
security and more about “separation.”  As the wall approaches the final construction 
stages, the political goals of the barrier are becoming more and more clear.  Whether the 
end result is the “least politically painful course” or the removal of “the incentive to 
pursue changes that would improve long-term security prospects”, Israel has been 
successful in creating a barrier that not only accomplishes its goal of security but also 
enforces irreversible Israeli political decisions.   
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Conclusion 
The Israeli Security Barrier pops up out of nowhere.  I know this because I’ve 
been there.  In 2010, while studying in Israel for 6 months, I had the opportunity to spend 
two days learning about the security barrier first hand.   On the Israeli side, I spoke with 
the family of victims of terrorist attacks who emotionally described how they wish the 
barrier had been constructed sooner.  On the Palestinian side, in the West Bank, I spoke 
with barrier protestors who painfully described how much the wall has changed their 
lives.  I walked along the wall on both sides.  I felt the concrete that separated two sides 
of the most complex conflict in our world today.  I dissected the powerful graffiti drawn 
by artists, supporters and opponents.  I watched the Israeli-Defense Force patrol and 
enforce its new security policy. I learned about the barrier in a way that no book or article 
could teach.  This experience was the beginning of an investigation that has provided a 
greater understanding of the issues surrounding the Israel security barrier.  From the 
research done for this paper, I have drawn several conclusions.   
I. Suicide Terror 
Almost all of the current commentary on the Israeli security barrier mentions or 
focuses on the phenomenon that the barrier was Israel’s response to a rise in suicide 
terror.  The Israeli government has confirmed and supported this to defend itself against 
attacks from the international community. In actuality, the barrier has done an incredibly 
impressive job at removing the threat of suicide terror to Israeli citizens.  It is necessary 
to reiterate that since construction of the wall commenced terrorist activities within the 
state of Israel have completely ceased.  The Israeli Defense Force has worked effectively 
to utilize the barrier as a terrorist stopping entity.  By limiting access to the country, 
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increasing patrols and stepping up security, the government of Israel has successfully 
accomplished its goal.   
Removing the threat of suicide terror has been one of the greatest successes for 
the Israeli government throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All governments 
throughout the world have the responsibility to keep their citizens safe.  Israel realized 
that their citizens were in danger everyday and did something to protect them.  It is hard 
to critique Israel for creating a security structure with the goal of protecting human life. 
There is large support, as there should be, for the barrier as a true security tool.  I strongly 
agree with the choice by Israel to establish this barrier to stifle terrorism.  In this regard, 
Israel has acted properly and is just in its actions to construct the wall.   
II. Offense-Defense 
The Offense-Defense theory discussed in Chapter II is something that must be 
paid large attention to in the next few years of the barriers existence.  My conclusions in 
Chapter II stated that the barrier does not currently provide an offensive or defensive 
stance.  In fact, the Israeli government has used the security barrier to accomplish both 
offensive and defensive goals. This equilibrium between offense and defense has allowed 
the balance to remain even.  Although this status quo has been the case thus far for the 
security barrier, it is extremely necessary for the international community to continue to 
focus on the offense-defense balance surrounding the barrier.  Keeping a close 
examination on the balance will ultimately allow the international community to get a 
advantageous understanding of Israeli intentions. Offense and defense intentions will be 
made clear by the Israeli government through their actions regarding the wall. If Israel 
mobilizes more armed personnel to the barrier as well as places more advanced weaponry 
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along the route, offensive intentions may be concluded.  If Israel creates tighter border 
controls and further limits the flow of people across its borders, defensive intentions may 
be concluded.  There been little attention paid to the offense-defense phenomenon in the 
case of the Israeli security barrier but the research in this paper provides support for the 
importance of focusing on this balance in the future. I would argue that the offense-
defense balance must be given more attention as it evolves into a greater part of this 
conflict.  Furthermore, I would also argue that the Israeli government should only take 
defensive actions vis a vis the wall.  Offensive actions will not help the Israeli 
government make any gains in the peace negotiations nor in their mission to create a 
stable environment in the Middle East.   
III. Not a Temporary Barrier  
A few years ago many people believed that this barrier was a temporary fix for 
the conflict between Israeli’s and Palestinians.  The wall would be built until a more 
definite solution could be reached.  The research done for this paper has shown that this 
wall is by no means temporary.  The Israeli government is spending millions of dollars to 
construct this wall and is literally cementing it in to place.  The confirmation that the 
barrier is not temporary will have enormous effects on the conflict.  
As the barrier continues to cause social and economic hardships on the Palestinian 
citizens, more and more unrest will begin to occur.  The Palestinians will continue to 
come to terms with the idea that they are essentially trapped in an enclosed area with no 
way out.  This may cause further frustrations in the West Bank leading to heightened 
violence and resistance against the Israeli power.   
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The permanent barrier will also pose new challenges to Israel in the future.  The 
barrier, and the upkeep necessary for it to remain a powerful security tool, will place 
large strains on Israel’s economy. Since the beginning of construction the cost of the 
barrier has ballooned from $1billion USD to $2.1 billion USD.  It is estimated that every 
kilometer of the barrier costs $2 million USDs to construct.  Israel must prepare itself to 
make increased economic investments in to the barrier if they want it to continue to be 
effective.  The interesting piece here is whether or not the cost of up keeping a permanent 
barrier will outweigh the positive gains the wall is making.  In my opinion, the wall will 
become an enormously large economic burden for the Israeli government, which will 
cause a decrease in support for the wall.  As the appearance of suicide terror decreases, 
Israeli society may no longer favor a security system that costs more then it is actually 
worth. Furthermore, as Palestinian terrorists develop new ways to circumvent the barrier, 
the Israeli government will be faced with new costs that include strengthening the 
security system. Solidifying this barrier as a permanent part of the Israeli security system 
is absolutely going to create major issues for the Israeli government and will remain an 
important fixture in the conflict between security and border control.    
IV. Political Motives  
Chapter III of this paper focused on the other political motives behind the creation 
of the security barrier.  I confirmed in that chapter that the wall is intertwined with 
numerous Israeli policies that range from border definition to demographic balancing.  
The enforcement of political goals via the wall is something that should not astonish 
people.  Countries often use actions camouflaged by broad policy statements to 
accomplish more sensitive political goals.  Israel is no different.  However, I believe that 
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the sensitivity of the conflict between Israel and Palestine has caused Israel to come 
under large scrutiny and criticism from the international community.  Israel must combat 
this by coming to terms with the exact purpose of the barrier.  As Israel continues to 
neglect international judicial rulings as well as recommendations from allies, it will 
constantly have a difficult time justifying the reasons for the barriers existence.  Israel 
must establish more transparency with the international community and present viable 
and credible reasons for continuing to construct and support the barrier.   
V. The Future  
Historically, walls created by state entities have always been destroyed.  The 
Athens Long Walls were destroyed in 404 BC as part of a peace treaty after the 
Peloponnesian War. The Long Walls were dismantled only to be rebuilt and than 
dismantled again by the Macedonians in 323 BC (Sterling 52).     
Hadrian’s Wall fell after the emperor died.  The new emperor, who replaced 
Hadrian, abandoned the wall leaving it to crumble.  Eventually, in the late 4
th
 century, the 
Romans lost control of Britain and the walls were left to become the remains of an 
empire that once stood strong (Sterling 89.)     
Today, much of the Great Wall of China still stands.  However, the Wall became 
obsolete as a defense system when China’s borders extended beyond the Wall and the 
threatening Mongolians were annexed into the country.  Due to this phenomenon, 
construction and repair were discontinued (Sterling 142).   
The Maginot Line became extinct after World War II.  The rise of the French 
independent nuclear weapons system coupled with new advancement in technology 
caused the Line to become an unnecessary expense that the government could no longer 
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afford.  The ultimate result for all of these defense structures was destruction (Sterling 
238).   Whether this destruction was caused by political motives, economic weakness or 
physical actions, these walls have typically served to fill only a short-term security goal.  
Will the Israeli security barrier serve the same destiny?   
Most information will confirm that the Israeli security barrier is going to remain a 
piece of the Israeli landscape for many years to come.  Although economic burden, which 
was mentioned above, is a factor in the future of the barrier, Israel has a strong economy 
that has always been committed to spending on security. Unlike security defense systems 
in the past, the barrier will undoubtedly be supported by the Israeli economy as it 
continues to secure the state.  Moreover, the Israeli barrier does not face a major threat 
from a militarized state. Hadrian’s Wall, the Great Wall of China and the Athens Long 
Walls all fell because they were either destroyed by a powerful threat or were no longer 
needed to protect against that threat.  The Palestinian entity does not have the ability to 
attack the barrier in a manner that would cripple it.  Small weapons and arms are no real 
match for the power of the Israeli Defense Force and the wall poses too great an obstacle 
for the current Palestinian abilities.  
With the removal of economic and military threats, it can be concluded that the 
only way the barrier will fall is via politics. The downfall of previous security walls 
throughout history has been a result of militarized action, economic failure or neglect. If 
the Israeli security barrier were to fall because of the influence of politics it would be 
extremely historic.  In my opinion, domestic Israeli politics will not be the catalyst for the 
tearing down of the Israeli security barrier.  Instead, international politics and a push for 
an Israel-Palestinian peace solution by outside forces will be the ultimate reason for a 
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destruction of the barrier.  It is obvious that the barrier has forever changed the nature of 
the conflict.  If Israel ever wishes to come to an agreement with the Palestinian Authority 
they must first come to a solution about the existence of the barrier.  The Palestinian 
Authority has claimed numerous times that it will not negotiate with the Israeli 
government if the barrier continues to exist and the settlement issue is not dealt with. The 
Israeli government has clearly shown that it will not take down the barrier nor will it 
freeze or remove settlements.  This stalemate is currently one of the main reasons behind 
the halt in negotiations between the two sides.   
The only solution to re-energize the non-existent conversation between the two 
sides must come from the international community.  International action by powerful 
actors like the United States will be the only way a possible, agreed upon, and feasible 
solution can be developed.  However, this too seems to be a very distant goal with no real 
chance of ever becoming reality.  Studying the Israeli security barrier has shown that the 
world, as a whole, is currently in a border securing phase.  In fact, the United States has 
too been working on constructing an extremely technologically advance barrier between 
the U.S. and Mexico border.  This fence has been designed to limit the amount of illegal 
immigrants and drugs flowing into the United States.  Other countries, too, are working 
on tighter border controls to combat security issues like terrorism. These security 
measures represent a large global change.  Globalization once allowed borders to 
disappear, making free movement across countries a very common event.  Now, with the 
appearance of new security threats, countries are beginning to combat globalization with 
security structures along their borders.  The international community, and specifically the 
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Untied States, will have a hard time placing pressure on Israel to take down its barrier 
when these countries are building up their own borders.   
Israel’s security fence is here to stay.  The overall effect the barrier has on the 
security of the nation coupled with the lack of detrimental reasons for the Israeli’s to 
remove the barrier will allow the structure to remain in place for an indefinite amount of 
time.  Unfortunately, the existence of the wall does not leave room for much hope for 
peace between the Israeli’s and Palestinians. In fact, I believe that as long as the wall 
exists, so too will the conflict.  There is no possible way for the two entities to come to a 
peace agreement while one side, the Israeli’s, continue to construct and support a 
structure that has violated human rights as well as disobeyed international rulings.  There 
is also no way possible for peace to be reached if the other side, the Palestinians, continue 
to attack the Israeli citizens with suicide and other forms of terror.  Both sides must come 
to realize that they are committing acts that are counterproductive to a peace goal.  If this 
does not happen, peace will never occur.   
One day, traveling between the West Bank and Jerusalem may only involve 
presenting passport credentials.  For now, a maze of border crossings, credential checks 
and struggles is reality.  The Israeli security barrier is a concrete reminder of the climate 
in the Middle East.  The security barrier will remain between the West Bank and 
Jerusalem, between peace and conflict.  In a place of extreme beauty and religious power, 
stands a modern day reminder of the complexity of our world.  The monstrous concrete 
walls, the barbed wire, the constant patrols, and the conflict that surrounds it all provides 
a powerful examination of the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the 
major issues facing the world today. 
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